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The goal of the present thesis is to analyze the diverging savings and investment behavior
among countries. The purpose of this work is to suggest possible explanations for the so
called ￿global imbalances￿ . In particular, the focus is on the negative asset positions of
the US and the positive asset positions of emerging economies. The ￿rst two chapters
study the e⁄ects of capital market liberalization among countries with structural di⁄erences
and in particular di⁄erent ￿nancial market depth. Global imbalances are generated by
higher propensity to save as well as lower propensity to invest in ￿nancially underdeveloped
countries, with respect to countries with better ￿nancial institutions. The analysis is able to
reproduce medium term net capital ￿ ows towards ￿nancially advanced economies as a result
of ￿nancial integration. Moreover, capital liberalization generates welfare losses for emerging
economies and a reduction of their capital convergence towards the steady state. The third
chapter focuses on one of the most debated aspects of international capital movements,
namely sovereign reserve accumulation by emerging countries, as a form of precautionary
saving to be employed to face liquidity crises. The analysis investigates the determinants of
the opportunity cost of holding reserves, and ￿nds that countries optimally decide to hold a
positive amount of reserves. Countries￿lenders set the cost of debt by taking into account
countries￿decisions and their economic and ￿nancial characteristics.
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Capital ￿ ows among countries have dramatically increased in the last 20 years. This
intensi￿cation has not been evenly distributed across countries and time. There are however
some persistent trends in the net foreign assets positions of some countries, and in particular
negative asset positions of the US and positive asset positions of emerging economies. In the
literature some researchers interpret those trends as the result of virtuous market equilibria;
others consider those ￿global imbalances￿a source of further instability that can lead to
disruptive reversals. Moreover, during the recent ￿nancial crisis the global imbalances of the
international ￿nancial positions have been judged as one of the possible channels through
which the crisis has been exacerbated. Today policy makers in international fora declare the
need for joint e⁄orts to reduce those imbalances.
The purpose of this work is to highlight some causes of these diverging asset positions.
The underlying hypothesis of the present analysis is that countries behave optimally, given
some important constraints, therefore the aim is not to give normative prescriptions on the
choice of international capital movements; the goal is to understand how those constraints
lead to countries￿optimal, yet very di⁄erent, choices.
In this thesis I analyze how international capital movements are shaped by di⁄erent
propensity to save and invest in di⁄erent countries. In the ￿rst two chapters I highlight
the e⁄ects of capital market liberalization among countries with structural di⁄erences and
in particular di⁄erent ￿nancial market depth. Global imbalances are generated by higher
propensity to save as well as lower propensity to invest in ￿nancially underdeveloped coun-
tries, with respect to countries with better ￿nancial institutions. Moreover, I stress the
welfare consequences of capital account liberalization as well as the short and long run ef-
fects on production and the interest rate for integrated countries with persistent ￿nancial
depth asymmetries. The third chapter focuses on one of the most debated aspects of inter-
national capital movements, namely sovereign reserve accumulation by emerging countries
as a form of precautionary saving to be employed to face liquidity crises. Together with my
coauthor, Emanuele Tarantino, we study what determines the opportunity cost of holding
reserves, and ￿nd that countries optimally decide to hold a positive amount of reserves.
In the ￿rst chapter I build on the idea of saving glut explanation of global imbalances, pro-
posed by Ben Bernanke, to reproduce the diverging net asset positions of the US with respect
to the emerging economies. In particular I explain the materialization of global imbalances
as the result of capital account liberalization among countries with structural di⁄erences,
and in particular di⁄erent ￿nancial market depth. I formalize the ￿nancial development as
the ability to insure entrepreneurs against idiosyncratic shocks to their production. There-
fore the higher the sophistication of the ￿nancial market the lower is the impact of the




shocks on agents￿wealth. Poor ￿nancial institutions bring about low capital accumulation
and high levels of savings, with respect to the e¢ cient allocation. When two countries that
di⁄er only in their level of ￿nancial depth decide to liberalize their capital movements, in the
less ￿nancially developed economy agents decrease risky investments and increase savings
by purchasing foreign risk free bonds, while in the other country agents produce more and
accumulate liabilities. This chapter therefore replicates not only large net foreign asset po-
sitions of the advanced country as well as of the emerging economy, but also lower risk-free
interest rates and lower capital before integration for the latter. Moreover capital account
liberalization brings about negative welfare gains for the ￿nancially less developed country,
and in particular for the poorer inside this country, and positive welfare gains in the ￿nan-
cially advanced economy. By making use of this setup, I interpret the recent ￿nancial crisis
as worsened ￿nancial conditions for all, but more so for the poor country, in line with the
data. The increased gap in the ￿nancial market development pushes the emerging market to
further increase savings and decrease investment, which results overall in even larger global
imbalances.
In the second chapter I take a di⁄erent perspective. The goal is to understand the
consequences of capital account liberalization for a large emerging economy, in the process
of accumulating capital towards its steady state, which decides to open its capital account
towards an advanced economy that has already reached its steady state of autarky. In line
with the previous chapter, the two economies di⁄er in their level of ￿nancial depth. The
asymmetry in the levels of ￿nancial depth has important e⁄ects on the convergence rate.
The immediate e⁄ect of integration is that capital accumulation slows down in the emerging
economy, with respect to the autarky accumulation path. Agents optimally decide to move
resources from investment and present consumption to foreign bonds, therefore postponing
growth and consumption. Equalization of the marginal productivity of capital, adjusted
for risk, with the risk-free interest rate, together with the high precautionary motive drive
the present result. If the emerging economy has a low level of accumulated capital at the
moment of integration, it experiences an initial capital in￿ ow of modest entity, followed by
large capital out￿ ows in search for safe assets. The present analysis can therefore replicate the
empirical evidence of emerging economies￿negative current account followed by the ￿uphill￿
￿ ow of capital, towards advanced countries, as documented among others by Prasad et al.
(2007). At the moment of capital account liberalization, agents in the advanced economy
experience welfare gains, while agents in the other country undergo welfare losses. Those
losses are however attenuated if the country is at an early stage of capital accumulation at
the moment of integration, while it is particularly strong for emerging economies that are




close to the steady state.
There is however another important di⁄erence between the ￿rst and second chapter. The
peculiar hypotheses on the functional forms in the ￿rst chapter (CARA utility function and
normal distribution of the shock) allow insulating the e⁄ect of ￿nancial ine¢ ciencies on the
risk premium for investing in risky activities, which is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the
marginal productivity of capital and the risk-free interest rate. In fact, the CARA-Normal
speci￿cation shuts down any wealth e⁄ect on capital choice, therefore it allows to highlight
the direct link between ￿nancial development and the gap between saving and investment
in each country, therefore the global imbalances. In line with the standard (neo-classical)
framework, the steady state level of capital depends only on the interest rate. In equilibrium,
the amount of installed capital equalizes the marginal productivity of capital adjusted for
risk with the interest rate on risk-free bonds. The e⁄ect of integration on the steady state
levels of capital is higher capital and therefore production in the advanced country and lower
in the emerging economy, both with respect to the autarky steady state levels.
In the second chapter, I use a more standard functional speci￿cation (CRRA utility func-
tion and log-normal distributions of the shocks). In this framework, capital accumulation,
beside the e⁄ects of the interest-rate and the risk premium, is also a⁄ected by each agent￿ s
wealth. This seems more in line with empirical evidence and brings about important long run
results. Risky capital is positively related to wealth, therefore, the advanced economy, with
its increasing negative assets positions, in the long run will converge to a level of capital and
production lower than the one of autarky. Instead, the emerging economy, by accumulating
positive risk-free assets, converges to a steady state level of capital higher than the autarky
one.
The technical di⁄erences between the two chapters allow characterizing the mechanisms
at work. The short and medium run consequences of capital account liberalization are almost
entirely due to the e⁄ect of the risk premium for investing in risky activities: this result is
common in the two chapters. The long run consequences instead, are determined by the
levels of aggregate wealth, which in turn are the result of persistent asymmetries in saving
and investment decisions.
The third chapter analyzes one important aspect of the global imbalances, namely sov-
ereign reserve accumulation by emerging economies. In the last years the level of sovereign
reserves accumulated by emerging countries has increased dramatically, also in the aftermath
of the ￿nancial crisis. A large part of researchers as well as policy makers believe the accu-
mulated amounts are too high, in terms of country￿ s opportunity cost of holding them. The




aim of this chapter is to highlight country-speci￿c ￿nancial and economic characteristics that
a⁄ect the opportunity cost of holding reserves. We take into account, among other aspects,
the e⁄ects of reserves on the sovereign cost of borrowing from foreign markets. We study
the contracting game between a sovereign country and its international lenders in order to
contemporaneously assess the optimal level of reserves, chosen by the country, and the cost of
debt, set by the creditors. Reserves represent, for the country, a safe and liquid investment,
that can be employed should a liquidity crisis occur. Moreover, reserves are not pledgeable,
in case of sovereign default, and distract resources from a productive but risky and illiquid
project. There is perfect information; markets are characterized by two important ￿nancial
frictions, widely used in the literature: creditors cannot inject resources in case of liquidity
crises, the country cannot commit not to default on debt if it ￿nds convenient to do so. In
line with the empirical evidence, we ￿nd that the cost of the sovereign debt decreases when
the level of reserves increases, but only if the probability of a liquidity crisis is high enough.
However, the cost of debt could increase with reserves when lenders anticipate that in case
of a liquidity crisis the country will prefer to default. We moreover ￿nd that other variables
play important roles in determining the willing to hold large amounts of reserves: the vari-
ability of country￿ s output, the degree of ￿nancial market openness and ￿nancial institution
depth, the productivity and the dimension of the economy.










THE SAVING GLUT EXPLANATION OF GLOBAL
IMBALANCES: THE ROLE OF
UNDERINVESTMENT
Abstract
According to the ￿ Saving Glut hypothesis￿ , global imbalances are caused by an inef-
￿ciently high level of precautionary savings in ￿nancially underdeveloped regions, where
agents have limited opportunity to diversify idiosyncratic risk. This paper generalizes the
approach by modeling idiosyncratic risk in entrepreneurial activities, which can be only par-
tially hedged. As a result, agents save too much and invest too little, relative to the e¢ cient
allocation, depressing production activities and the real interest rate. Capital account liber-
alization towards ￿nancially more advanced economies then produces an out￿ ow of capital in
search of safer investment, with the e⁄ect of further reducing domestic investment in coun-
tries with poor ￿nancial institutions. The model predicts welfare losses for less ￿nancially
developed economies, and an increase in wealth inequality for advanced economies. Finally,
the present analysis is able to explain the direct link between the ￿nancial crisis and global
recession and the long run implications of worsening ￿nancial conditions on countries￿net
external positions.
1
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1.1 Introduction
"Over the past decades a combination of diverse forces has created a signi￿cant increase
in the global supply of savings - a global saving glut - which helps to explain both the increase
in the US current account de￿cit and the relative low level of long-term real interest rate."
Ben Bernanke, March 10, 2005 speech at the Sandridge Lecture, Richmond, Virginia
Bernanke is credited with the idea that the US current account de￿cits in recent years
are due to a saving glut in the rest of the world. According to this view, ￿nancial global
imbalances are the equilibrium result of structural di⁄erences that emerged among groups
of countries. Bernanke￿ s position has recently been developed and formalized in the interna-
tional portfolio literature. Several contributions point at gaps in ￿nancial market develop-
ment, ￿nancial integration or growth potential among countries to generate precautionary
savings di⁄erences in US with respect to other developed and emerging economies, these in
turn cause ￿nancial global imbalances, as observed in the data. Only the savings side of the
current account is typically analyzed in these studies. The aim of our work is to go one step
further and disentangle the two components of the current account: investment and savings.
We explicitly model the impact of ￿nancial market institutions on investment demand and
savings supply in order to show that ￿nancial integration among economies with structural
di⁄erences in their ￿nancial markets generates, not only precautionary savings, but also
underinvestment in ￿nancially less developed countries. The two aspects together combine
to generate large and persistent net ￿nancial borrowing by the ￿nancially more advanced
economy.
Finally the present analysis contributes to the discussion on the e⁄ects of the ￿nancial
crisis with two important results: on the one hand worsened global ￿nancial conditions
have the direct e⁄ect of reducing investment and lowering interest rates, bringing about
a global reduction in output. On the other hand the widened gap between industrialized
and emerging countries in their level of ￿nancial development exacerbates the saving glut
in its two components of domestic underinvestment and higher precautionary savings, and
therefore the negative net external position of the US.
We present a two-country model with heterogeneous agents and idiosyncratic production
risks. The development of ￿nancial institutions is formalized as the ability of the market to
absorb and redistribute idiosyncratic shocks to production, therefore the higher the sophis-
tication of the ￿nancial market the lower is the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on agents￿
wealth. In this framework consumers decide to accumulate more savings the higher is their
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
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uninsurable risk; the new element of our analysis is that entrepreneurs face a risk premium
for investing in risky production, instead of risk free bonds, and therefore they invest less
the more variable their productive activities are. The development of ￿nancial markets has a
strong impact on the equilibrium level of interest rate and GDP: the lower the ability to in-
sure entrepreneurs against idiosyncratic shocks, the lower the capital and interest rate in the
steady state.1 When two countries with di⁄erent ￿nancial institutions decide to reciprocally
open their capital accounts by exchanging risk free bonds, in the less ￿nancially developed
economy agents decrease risky investments and increase savings by purchasing foreign risk
free bonds, while in the other country agents produce more and accumulate liabilities. This
paper therefore replicates not only the large ￿nancial imbalances of developed countries, but
also lower risk-free interest rates and lower capital accumulation in less ￿nancially developed
economies: a condition that worsens when the country opens to foreign capital.
Financial integration results in overall negative welfare gains for poorer economies and
slightly positive for others. The main channel is the increase in the interest rate with respect
to the risk-adjusted return on production investment for emerging economies; this divergence
pushes agents to accumulate savings, postpone consumption and shift investment to foreign
bonds instead of internal production capital. Wealth conditions worsen for the poorer in
developing countries, since they face higher interest on their debt. Only the richest, in the
last decile of the wealth distribution, are better o⁄ since they receive higher returns on
their accumulated assets. In contrast, the ￿nancially more developed economies experience
a decrease in their interest rates that boosts consumption and investment in entrepreneurial
activities. They therefore move resources from safe investment in bonds, which are now less
pro￿table, to risky production capital. This is the main cause of the increased dispersion in
the wealth distribution and therefore an increase in wealth inequality.
The immediate consequences of the ￿nancial crisis are worsened ￿nancial conditions,
that in this setup translate into higher uninsurable risks associated with production activ-
ities, in all countries; the direct e⁄ects are a decrease in the level of invested capital and a
lower equilibrium interest rate for all. Poorer economies, however, experience larger drops in
the quality of their ￿nancial markets compared with ￿nancially more advanced economies.
This, in an integrated world, results in a further reduction in the level of risky investment
and an additional incentive to accumulate precautionary savings in the form of foreign risk
free bonds. In countries that are ￿nancially more advanced, integration helps to mitigate
the negative e⁄ects of the ￿nancial turmoil since the new and very low level of interest
1Bandiera et al. (2000) document that the real risk free interest rate, before ￿nancial liberalization takes
place, is depressed in emerging economies with respect to the advanced ones. Moreover Bon￿glioli (2008),
among others, shows that ￿nancial development has a positive impact on growth.
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rate discourages an excessive drop in production investment, boosts consumption and fur-
ther reduces the precautionary saving motive. The present analysis therefore predicts an
acceleration in the negative and growing net external position of the US.
Welfare consequences are negative for all the countries hit by the ￿nancial crisis. However
the very poor in ￿nancially more advanced economies have slightly positive welfare gains
due to lower interest rates paid on their accumulated debt and a boost in consumption (two
hypotheses drive this result: no borrowing constraints and no possibilities of default).
In the literature there are several contributions that stress the role of ￿nancial institutions
in explaining international capital ￿ ows. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) stress the
importance of the availability of domestic ￿nancial instruments for real investments together
with growth di⁄erentials to generate capital ￿ ows toward the US. Prades and Rabitsch (2009)
look at di⁄erences in ￿nancial liberalization processes and aggregate productivity to explain
￿nancial global imbalances and in particular the US external de￿cit. In this context, Fogli
and Perri (2006) point to the e⁄ects of ￿nancial innovation in decreasing output volatility
that, in turn, reduces precautionary saving needs and brings about large global imbalances.
In the present work, however, emphasis is put on idiosyncratic risks, since, as documented
by Angeledis among others, they explain more than half of total economic variability in the
US. We want to show that heterogeneity among agents, by in￿ uencing their choices, has
an impact on the aggregate equilibrium of the economy, and also on its interactions with
other countries. In this sense, the contribution of Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007)
(MQR henceforth), is the closest to our analysis. MQR model economies in which agents
are subject only to idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity. They build a model based on
Aiyagari (1994) but extend it to two countries, and formalize ￿nancial market institutions
by introducing limited liability constraints on net worth. In the ￿rst country with less
developed ￿nancial markets households are subject to tight borrowing constraints, therefore
they save more at any level of the interest rate in order to have enough resources to face bad
idiosyncratic shocks. When this country frees its capital movements with a ￿nancially more
developed country (with therefore looser borrowing constraints and higher interest rate in
equilibrium) agents of the former country are encouraged to save even more, given the higher
interest rate in equilibrium. The opposite happens for households in the developed economy:
they prefer to consume more in the present since they can borrow at a cheaper price than
before. MQR are able to give an explanation of the large and persistent ￿nancial imbalances
observed in the data: they are generated by di⁄erent ￿nancial structures of countries that
open their capital accounts.
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There are two main di⁄erences between MQR and the present study. First of all MQR
results are driven by the impact of ￿nancial depth on consumer￿ s behavior. They ￿nd,
however, that before opening to global ￿nancial markets, a developing country saves and
produces more than a developed one, bringing the ambiguous message that better ￿nancial
institutions are detrimental for countries￿capital accumulation. Moreover this is at odds with
the data.2 In our analysis we focus on the impact of ￿nancial markets on entrepreneurial
decisions as well as on consumers￿choices: in equilibrium poor ￿nancial institutions result in
lower capital accumulation and a lower interest rate in less ￿nancially developed economies.
Improvements in developing countries￿￿nancial markets generate only positive outcomes
since they help to enhance welfare, stimulate investment and dampen large uninsurable
￿nancial volatility. The second di⁄erence is in the formalization of ￿nancial markets: MQR
introduce a borrowing limit. In our study, in contrast, agents are not constrained on short
sales; this enables the model to fully show the e⁄ect of ￿nancial incompleteness, formalized
as missing insurance markets, on savings and investment decisions. Moreover the investment
risk premium, which in the model is given by the wedge between the risk-free interest rate
and return on capital and is generated by ￿nancial underdevelopment, has its counterpart in
￿nancial data. Therefore it creates a clear mapping from the model to our empirical study,
as highlighted in the next section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates important
stylized facts on ￿nancial globalization and ￿nancial development. Section 3 presents the
closed economy model and focuses, in particular, on the impact of market incompleteness
on saving and investment choices for single agents and for the aggregate steady state of the
economy. In section 4 we present the steady-state results for the open economy setup, in
which risk free bonds can be exchanged across countries. In section 5 we show the results of
the quantitative exercise. Section 6 extends the results to account for the ￿nancial crisis. In
section 7 some sensitivity analysis is conducted. Section 8 concludes with some ￿nal remarks.
1.2 Stylized facts
The present section aims at motivating our analysis by explaining the de￿nitions and
presenting important ￿gures on ￿nancial openness, international capital ￿ ows and measures
of ￿nancial development (before and at the moment of the ￿nancial crisis) used in the rest
of this study.
2Bon￿glioli (2007) for example ￿nds no direct relation between ￿nancial openness and investment while
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Figure 1.1: Net foreign asset position over GDP. Data source: updated and extended version
of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Figure 1.1 shows that the US current account has been negative since the end of the 80￿ s
and it has dropped dramatically during the last 10 years reported in the picture. Emerging
economies￿negative position has instead been recovering in the last 7 years of the sample.
Capital account liberalization is still an ongoing process and there are substantial dif-
ferences among countries. Chinn and Ito (2007) construct an index of countries￿￿nancial
integration based on de jure and de facto measure of ￿nancial restrictions. We divide their
sample into industrialized and emerging economies3 and plot this information in ￿gures 1.2
and 1.3, respectively. It is clear that emerging countries are far less integrated into interna-
tional capital markets; therefore it is important for them to understand the possible e⁄ects
of further liberalization in order to get all positive bene￿ts and avoid negative outcomes.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 also compare the evolution of gross country liabilities with the one
of ￿nancial integration. Again there are important di⁄erences between the two groups of
countries. For emerging economies, increasing ￿nancial globalization seems to bring about a
slight decrease in gross liabilities, therefore lower capital in￿ ows, while the opposite is true
for industrialized economies. This observation is at odds with the neoclassical paradigm
which predicts that countries scarce in capital will experience capital in￿ ows once they open
their current account.
Figure 1.4 points in the same direction as ￿gure 1.3: it shows that the countries with
she ￿nds a positive relation that links ￿nancial depth with capital accumulation.
3This division is taken from Lane and Milesi - Ferretti (2007).
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Figure 1.2: Financial integration (Kaopen), source: Chinn and Ito (2007); gross countries￿
liabilities, source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Figure 1.3: Financial integration (Kaopen), source: Chinn and Ito (2007); gross countries￿
liabilities, source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Figure 1.4: Average per-capita GDP, weighted by participation in international ￿nancial
markets (Assets+Liabilities) over highest per-capita GDP in each year. Source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
negative net asset positions are no longer the emerging economies (with therefore lower
per capita GDP). This was ￿rst observed by Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) who
talk about the "uphill" ￿ ow of capital from developing to developed economies. Moreover
they show that nonindustrial countries, that rely less on foreign capital, grow faster. The
di⁄erence with the ￿gure of Prasad et al. (2007) is that in our estimation countries are
weighted by their de facto participation in international ￿nancial markets, as de￿ned by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (sum of foreign assets and liabilities). In contrast, Prasad
et al (2007) use net asset positions. As shown in the previous ￿gure, emerging economies
experienced an acceleration in the integration process in the last 15 years, but this period
does not seem to correspond with an overall capita in￿ ow in those countries.
The analysis of ￿nancial depth suggests that there are still large di⁄erences among coun-
tries. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) propose two measures of ￿nancial depth
(reported in table 1): PRIVO is the total credit to the private sector over GDP, which is
therefore a de facto indicator, while Laworder is an index, ranging between 1 and 6, which
summarizes the information on the legal system and the protection of citizens.
Figure 1.5 is a scatter plot of data for 2007 on ￿nancial development, PRIVO, and data
on the risk premium estimated by Aswath Damodaran, who elaborates data furnished by
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Figure 1.5: Measure of ￿nancial market development (Privo), source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2009); measure of country risk premium, source: Damodaran (2008).
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Figure 1.6: Measure of ￿nancial market development (Privo), source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2009); measure of country risk premium, source: Damodaran (2009).
Moody￿ s, Bloomberg and Standard&Poor￿ s.4 The measure of ￿nancial market development,
PRIVO, seems to be negatively correlated with the risk premium; therefore countries with
large risk premium are also the ones with poor ￿nancial market development. The risk
premium seems, therefore, to be a good proxy for ￿nancial market development. We there-
fore use this risk premium measure, which represents the depth of ￿nancial institutions, to
calibrate our parameter on ￿nancial development in the quantitative exercise, through the
investment risk premium generated by our model.
Figure 1.6 reports the scatter plot of PRIVO and the risk premium in 2008. Compared
with 2007 data, the risk premium has risen in almost every country, but this increase is
particularly strong in emerging markets. Worsened ￿nancial conditions have a deeper impact
in countries with weaker ￿nancial institutions, therefore the gap between industrialized and
emerging economies on their level of risk has increased during the current ￿nancial crisis.
As mentioned in the previous section, the development of ￿nancial markets in the present
analysis is de￿ned as the ability of ￿nancial institutions to transfer resources among agents
and, in particular, to help consumers and entrepreneurs hedge their idiosyncratic shocks.
The importance of ￿rm-level shocks is documented by, among others, Angelidis (2008) who
4It is the measure of risk premium for a mature equity market adjusted by country rat-
ing and default spread for that rating. Data are available at www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/-
adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256361.3. THE MODEL 11
documents that 55% of US market volatility is due to single ￿rms￿volatility. Moreover, Jer-
mann and Quadrini (2006) show that US ￿rms have experienced greater ￿nancial ￿ exibility
given by their increased ability to issue equities and bonds that, in turn, are used to respond
to bad shocks instead of reducing investment and production.
1.3 The model
The model we present is based on Angeletos and Calvet (2006). It is a neoclassical
economy with heterogeneous agents, convex technologies and idiosyncratic production risks.
Financial markets are incomplete and agents take this into account when deciding how
to allocate the production of the ￿nal good, either to consumption, investment in risky
production or in risk free bonds. Two main assumptions make this model easily tractable:
the CARA speci￿cation for the utility function and the normal distribution of the shocks.
These assumptions allow us to get a closed form solution for the policy functions and therefore
to track investments and savings choices and the impact of each parameter on them. There
are some drawbacks in this speci￿cation. First of all the CARA utility function does not rule
out negative consumption, especially in the early stage of capital accumulation or if income
is highly variable. The present exercise however looks at the steady state when agents have
accumulated capital and the probability of negative wealth is very close to zero (even if still
positive). Also the normal distribution of productivity shocks might bring about negative
production that could be interpreted as negative pro￿ts but still implies that a positive
investment brings to destruction of some of the inputs employed in the production. As
mentioned above there are no borrowing constraints, however Angeletos and Calvet (2005)
prove that, since the optimal decision rules of the in￿nite setup are the limit of the ￿nite
horizon problem, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in the strongest conceivable way, along any
possible path. Moreover, Wang (2003) proves that in this setup the transversality condition
on bond demand is always satis￿ed.
Angeletos (2007) shows that a model with more standard assumptions on preferences
and technology, CRRA utility function and log-normal support for production risks (and
therefore the possibility of de￿ning a natural borrowing limit) produces exactly the same
interesting results: lower interest rate and lower capital accumulation with respect to the
complete markets case. The CARA-Normal speci￿cation is therefore not essential to obtain
the big insights of the model in its closed economy version and, in particular, the relationship
between ￿nancial development and the aggregate dynamics.5 The CARA-Normal is indeed
5For the open-economy version of Angeletos (2007) see Angeletos and Panousi (2010) and Corneli (2010).
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much more tractable.
There are 2 countries 1 and 2. Each country is indexed by i. Time is discrete. There is
a continuum of consumer - producers of mass 1 in each country. Each agent has an income
of:
yit = Aitf(kit) (1.1)
This is the production of consumption goods each agent produces, by investing the
amount of capital k in her own ￿rm (she cannot invest in other production activities).
A is a productivity shock that is normally distributed with mean 1 and variance ￿2
iA: A
is an iid shock, independent across agents and time. ￿iA represents the formalization of
￿nancial market underdevelopment: it is the share of the idiosyncratic risk associated with
entrepreneurial activities that ￿nancial markets are not able to insure. A value of zero for
￿iA indicates that ￿nancial markets are able to hedge all production risks. Angeletos and
Calvet (2006) prove that lowering ￿iA; corresponds to introducing ￿nancial activities that
are able to partially hedge production shocks (Appendix A analyzes this interpretation of
the parameter ￿iA).
The capital stock is chosen at t-1 and cannot be reshu› ed once agents observe their
shocks at time t. The production function f exhibits decreasing returns to scale for capital.
We choose a simple speci￿cation widely used in the literature: f(kit) = k￿
it:
At time t, agents can purchase a risk-free bond bit+1, this will yield (1 + rit+1) units of
the consumption good at time t+1. The riskless bond is in zero net supply in the closed
economy.6
The budget constraint of each agent at time t is therefore:
cit + kit+1 + bit+1 = yit + (1 + rit)bit + (1 ￿ ￿)kit (1.2)
or
cit + kit+1 + bit+1 = wit (1.3)
Where wit represents the total wealth at time t that can be used to consume, invest in
the risky production or invest in risk free bonds.
6The case of perfect insurance in this model corresponds to the variance ￿2
iA being equal to zero. In our
setup this case is computationally equivalent to an economy with contingent bonds.
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Where the parameter ￿ represents the degree of risk aversion but it also represents the
willingness to substitute consumption over time.
1.3.1 Optimization problem
Given a deterministic sequence of prices frit+1g
1
t=0 , households choose consumption,
capital and risk-free bonds fcit;kit+1;bit+1g
1
t=0 that satisfy their lifetime utility subject to
their budget constraints.
The optimization problem for each agent can be written with a value function:
Vit(wit) = max
cit;kit+1;bit+1
fu(cit) + ￿EtVit+1(wit+1)g (1.5)
Given the properties of the CARA-normal speci￿cation, an educated guess for the value
function and the consumption rule are:
Vit(wit) = u(aitwit + dit) (1.6)
cit = ^ aitwit + ^ dit (1.7)
ait; ^ ait, dit, ^ dit are four non-random coe¢ cients to be determined. The certainty equiva-









Where ￿it, that represents the e⁄ective absolute risk aversion, is equal to:
￿it = ￿ait+1 (1.9)
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V art(wit+1) = (1 + rit+1)bit+1 + G(kit+1;￿it) (1.11)
Where








This quantity represents the risk-adjusted level of non-￿nancial wealth.
Combining the ￿rst order conditions for capital and bonds we get the relationship for
the optimal demand of investment:







The interest rate on the risk free bond is therefore equal to the marginal product of
capital minus a risk premium that takes into account the risk of investing in the production,
represented by ￿2
iA.
From the envelope condition, and making use of the educated guess, the Euler equation
is obtained:
u





The variance of the consumption can be written as:







Therefore the Euler equation becomes:
Etcit+1 ￿ cit =
1
￿










The choice between consumption and savings is a⁄ected by production variability. It
directly pushes agents to postpone consumption. However production risk has also the
indirect e⁄ect of lowering the level of capital invested in production, so the overall e⁄ect is
ambiguous.
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1.3.2 General equilibrium and steady state
Since the agents are characterized by CARA-normal speci￿cation, their investment be-
havior is independent of wealth and also consumption is linear in wealth. The wealth distri-
bution therefore does not a⁄ect the aggregate dynamics so it is possible to aggregate agents￿
choices to solve for the general equilibrium of this economy.
Since the shock to productivity is idiosyncratic, the general equilibrium is deterministic





t=0 such that the following relations are satis￿ed at any t ￿ 0:
Cit + Kit+1 = K
￿
it + (1 ￿ ￿)Kit (1.18)







Cit+1 ￿ Cit =
1
￿












it + (1 ￿ ￿)Kit ￿ 0 (1.21)
Where the ￿rst equation is the resource constraint, the second represents the aggregate
demand for investment and the third is the aggregate supply of savings. The last condition
is a limited liability constraint since it implies that countries cannot accumulate negative
levels of wealth. In closed economy this condition is always veri￿ed and never binding for
any level of Kit > 0:
The steady state relations therefore are:
Ciss + Kiss = K
￿
iss + (1 ￿ ￿)Kiss (1.22)
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Figure 1.7: The impact of uninsurable risks on the steady state relations.
K
￿
iss + (1 ￿ ￿)Kiss ￿ 0 (1.25)
Figure 1.7 shows how the steady state values for capital, the interest rate, consumption
and production vary as the shock to productivity becomes more variable.7 In this setting
in fact, the variance ￿2
iA (the standard deviation associated to it is the variable on the x-
axis, sigmaA) represents the coe¢ cient of variation in private consumption and investment
returns. In contrast to the Aiyagari (1994) result (which predicts that higher variability on
the endowment generates larger precautionary savings, therefore more capital accumulated at
any level of the interest rate), a ￿nancial market that is not able to fully insure productivity
shocks creates the conditions to invest less and save more at any give interest rate. The
upper-right panel shows how the spread between marginal productivity of capital and the
interest rate increases as the production variability gets larger. It therefore gives a clear
picture of the impact of ￿nancial development on the investment choice: it represents the
risk premium for investing in risky activities. A high risk premium for investing in risky
activities discourages capital accumulation and depresses the equilibrium risk free interest
7See Section 5 for details on the parameters calibration. The values chosen are standard in the literature
and insure locally unique steady states.
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rate. GDP is therefore lower in countries with higher uninsurable production variability. The
lower-left panel shows that high production risks induce agents to decrease consumption due
to lower production and to higher precautionary savings, that push interest rate down even
further.
1.4 Two-country integration
Capital account liberalization is formalized as the possibility of exchanging risk free
bonds across borders; ￿nancial market liberalization is not pre-announced. The integration
is not subject to restrictions nor costs for international transactions. The hypotheses are
extreme since there are no intermediate steps or constraints.
When the two countries liberalize their capital markets the interest rate is equalized
immediately, since it is the interest rate that regulates the exchange of risk free bonds, and
equalizes its global demand and supply.
The general equilibrium is again deterministic, since there are no aggregate shocks,
and characterized by the optimal choices of consumption, capital and bonds in the two
countries fC1t; K1t+1; B1t+1; C2t; K2t+1; B2t+1g
1
t=0 and the interest rate frt+1g
1
t=0 such that
the following relations are satis￿ed at any t ￿ 0 in both countries:
Cit + Kit+1 + Bit+1 = K
￿
it + (1 ￿ ￿)Kit + (1 + rt)Bit (1.26)







Cit+1 ￿ Cit =
1
￿










B1t+1 + B2t+1 = 0 (1.29)
Where the last equation is the equilibrium condition in the aggregate levels of bonds
exchanged between the two countries.
K
￿
it + (1 ￿ ￿)Kit + (1 + rt)Bit ￿ 0 (1.30)
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256361.4. TWO-COUNTRY INTEGRATION 18
The limited liability constraint in this case might be binding since each country can ac-
cumulate positive or negative amounts of bonds. This constraint however is not internalized
by agents that do not face individual borrowing constraints, therefore the optimal demand
and supply of savings are not a⁄ected.
Proposition 1 formalizes the characterization of the steady state with ￿nancial integra-
tion.
Proposition 1: Suppose that in a two- country world with one country (country 1)
￿nancially more developed than the other (country 2), in the autarky steady states it is true
that r1 > r2. The steady state equilibrium with ￿nancial integration is characterized by an
interest rate rss, such that r2 < rss < r1 and country 1 is net issuer of risk free bonds.
Appendix B reports the proof of this proposition.
1.4.1 Steady state - intuition
We ￿rst of all highlight the main di⁄erences in the autarky steady states of two countries
that are identical except for their ￿nancial depth, measured in terms of completeness of
￿nancial markets, and therefore the ability of the ￿nancial markets to absorb and redistribute
agent￿ s idiosyncratic shocks. Then we explain the result of proposition 1 on the open economy
steady state equilibrium.
We analyze the equilibrium without ￿nancial integration of the two countries: in the
￿rst one ￿nancial markets are incomplete, but the variability of uninsurable shock is small
(￿1A = 0:9) and in the second country ￿nancial markets are less developed (￿2A = 1:1).
Figure 1.8 shows that there are important di⁄erences in the demand and supply of
capital in the two countries before integration. In particular the demand for investment
curve represents ￿rms￿choice on how much capital to implement in the production. At the
steady state the demand is regulated by the equation:










Uninsured productivity shocks have a negative impact on the level of steady state capital
at any level of the interest rate, r. In fact, at any level of r; in country 1 the capital of steady
state is higher than in country 2 since the risk premium for investing in ￿rms located in
country 1 is smaller than for the ones in country 2.
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Figure 1.8: Autarky steady state capital and interest rate in two countries with di⁄erent ￿nancial
depth.
The supply of capital is the choice made by consumers on how much to save and consume.
It is determined by the Euler equation that in the steady state (when Cit+1 = Cit; 8 i;t) is:
1
￿












Uninsured shocks to production have a direct e⁄ect of increasing the precautionary sav-
ings at any level of the interest rate. Production risk has however the indirect negative impact
due to the lower level of capital chosen by entrepreneurs for higher values of the volatility
of the shock. Wealth variability is ampli￿ed by the total production, this determines the
positive relationship between capital accumulation and precautionary savings, therefore the
negative slope of the supply of capital curve in the R-K space.
From ￿gure 1.8 it can be therefore inferred that a less ￿nancially developed country at
the steady state has a lower level of capital accumulation and lower interest rate.
When the two countries liberalize their capital markets the interest rate is equalized
immediately, since it is the interest rate that regulates the exchange of risk free bonds and
equalizes its global demand and supply.
Figure 1.9 qualitatively represents what happens after liberalization. Intuitively, when
the two countries integrate, the interest rate (called r_i in the ￿gure) gets to an intermediate
value between the higher interest rate of country 1, the more ￿nancially developed, and the
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Figure 1.9: Steady state capital and interest rate in two countries with di⁄erent ￿nancial depth
that exchange risk free bonds.
lower one of country 2, as shown in the previous section. From the ￿rms￿investment decision
curves we are able to infer that the new interest rate stimulates investments in country 1,
leading to additional capital accumulation; in contrast, it reduces the level of investment
in country 2 and therefore its production, since at the new interest rate the risk premium
faced by entrepreneurs is too high compared with the risk free bond option. They decrease
investment up to the point at which the risk free interest rate and the productivity of capital
adjusted for risk are again equalized.
The ￿gure also shows that it is not possible to ￿nd an interest rate level for which agents
in the two countries contemporaneously have a constant level of consumption - savings. This
is because the precautionary saving motive in the two countries is always di⁄erent due to
di⁄erent wealth variability. In particular, at the lower world interest rate agents in country 1
want to increase immediate consumption and they can do so by issuing bonds. On the other
hand, agents in country 2 postpone consumption since at the interest rate of integration
they are willing to increase their savings, and are able to do it by purchasing bonds issued
by agents in country 1. The only special case of integration in which the two countries
reach a steady state with no permanent increase or decrease of savings in equilibrium is
when the supply curves coincide (either the two countries have the same level of ￿nancial
development, or for a combination of the parameters; both cases are however not interesting
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from an economic point of view).
1.5 Quantitative results
In this section we provide quantitative simulations of the model presented above. In
particular, by calibrating the model with actual data, the simulations presented are able to
reproduce long term movements in net capital ￿ ows. The assumptions on capital account
liberalization are "extreme": the two economies move from autarky to full integration in two
subsequent periods, without previous announcements.
1.5.1 Calibration
Each time period is set to 5 years, in order to capture the horizon of an investment
project. We calibrate 9 parameters to match some features on the global economy. In
particular we consider two blocks in our analysis: the US versus the rest of the world. Since
we are interested in aggregate ￿nancial ￿ ows we calibrate the 2 economies considering that
our "country 1", the US, is 29% of the world GDP, while we are not interested in matching
di⁄erences in productivity or population size.8
Parameter values
￿ income share of capital 0.4
1 ￿ ￿ annual discount rate 0.03
￿ annual capital depreciation rate 0.04
￿ annual capital adjustment cost 0.6
￿ absolute risk aversion 1
  elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
￿A1 uninsured idiosyncratic production shock st. dev., US 0.9
￿A2 uninsured idiosyncratic production shock st. dev., RoW 1.1
￿ Country 1(US) share of total GDP 0.289
The table above summarizes the calibration. The values of the parameters are the
standard values widely used in the literature, and are in line with existing micro-evidence:
8Data surce: updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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the annual discount factor ￿ is set to .97, the share of capital on income ￿ is set to .4,
the annual capital depreciation rate ￿ is .04, the absolute risk aversion ￿ and elasticity of
substitution   are equal to 1. In this quantitative simulation quadratic adjustment costs to
capital are introduced in order to get smooth capital movements; they however do not alter
the main results of the exercise and in particular international capital ￿ ows. The standard
quadratic form ￿(kit+1=Kit ￿1)2 is used, where kit+1 is the optimal level of capital chosen at
period t by each agent, Kit is the aggregate capital stock implemented at time t. The annual
capital adjustment shock, parameter ￿ = .6, is taken from Kehoe and Perri (2002). The
variability of US production activities that cannot be insured through the ￿nancial market
is chosen to get an interest rate of 4.79% after integration, while the uninsurable variability
of the rest of the world production is assigned to match the average country risk premium
over the US interest rate of 1.6%.9
1.5.2 Aggregate movements
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 report the transition of the main macroeconomic variables from
autarky to the steady state of integration.
In the ￿rst period the two economies are in autarky. As documented in the previous
sections, country 1 (the US in this exercise) is ￿nancially more developed, so in autarky
it experiences a higher interest rate, higher ratio of investment in risky activity (capital)
over its GDP and therefore higher production and a lower share of consumption in GDP.
Once the two economies open their markets for risk free bonds, the interest rate on safe
assets is immediately equalized to a value that is between the autarky levels, as proved in
proposition 1. In country 1 agents are willing to increase their investment in production
activities, since at the margin the return on capital adjusted for risk is too high. They start
therefore accumulating capital but due to the costs of adjusting capital stock the process is
not immediate, it lasts for 10 periods (or 50 years). The reverse happens in country 2 where
the risk premium on production activities is now too high compared with the safe investment
in bonds, therefore agents in this economy dismantle installed capital; output is therefore
reduced in this country while it increases in country 1. Two forces drive the consumption
choice: on the one hand agents face a new interest rate that induces agents in country 1
to consume immediately since they are more impatient, while it induces consumers in 2 to
9Data on risk premium is taken from Damodaran, as mentioned in section 2. Countries, in the "rest of
the world" group, are weighted by their partecipation in the international capital ￿ ows (IFIGDP from Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)).
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Figure 1.10: Response to capital account liberalization
postpone consumption due to their stronger and increased precautionary savings motive.
On the other hand the increase in production in country 1 stimulates precautionary savings
since total production ampli￿es the production risk. The ￿rst e⁄ect however dominates: it
induces a positive jump in country 1 consumption choice for the ￿rst periods and a negative
one for country 2 (this is preserved also with no capital adjustment costs). In the long run
however, due to the high debt issued by country 1, agents in this economy start decreasing
consumption in a very long lasting process; on the contrary agents of country 2 enjoy the
positive interest on the accumulated bonds.
The net export between the two economies, in ￿gure 1.11, mimics the consumption
evolution. In the ￿rst 5 periods, ￿rst 25 years, after integration, country 1 imports goods
from the other country since agents are willing to consume more than what is internally
produced, but after period 6 they have to repay the growing interest on accumulated debt and
therefore start reducing consumption below their total production. Country 2 accumulates
bonds issued by the other economy in a long lasting process, as showed in the net foreign
asset position panel, while country 1 has a growing debt and therefore also growing factor
payments.
The US current account drops in the ￿rst period of liberalization to around -1.5% of
GDP then slightly recovers and turns positive 6 periods (or 30 years) after integration. The
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Figure 1.11: Response to capital account liberalization
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last two panels represent the decomposition of the current account in variations, with respect
to the autarky levels, in investment and saving decisions.10 Country 1 therefore experiences
a negative current account variation because investment increases and saving decreases due
to lower precautionary savings at the new interest rate; the stimulus on investment demand
from the side of ￿rms generates a drop in the current account of around 0.48% of GDP,
while the decrease in the aggregate savings produces a variation in the current account on
impact of around 1% of GDP. The contrary happens in country 2: agents want to move
their savings from internal risky activities to safe foreign bonds since the risk premium
of production investment becomes too high compared with outside options, therefore the
variation in investment is negative and of 0.25% of magnitude. Moreover, agents in country
2 increase their precautionary savings with a positive jump of 0.5% in saving variations that
subsequently reduces and turns negative when those agents can enjoy the returns on the
accumulated assets.
1.5.3 Wealth distribution and welfare
We now turn our attention to the distributional and welfare e⁄ects of capital account
liberalization in each country. Since the two economies are populated by heterogeneous
agents, we can study the consequences of ￿nancial globalization for agents with di⁄erent
levels of wealth at the moment of liberalization.
Figure 1.12 shows the wealth distribution in the two countries in the autarky steady
states. The uninsurable shock to production risk is higher in country 2, but the aggregate
production (that ampli￿es the impact of the shock) is higher in country 1. The overall
result is that wealth is more dispersed in the ￿nancially less developed economy. This model
generates a variation in wealth dispersion when countries move from autarky to integration.
As mentioned before wealth variability depends on the development of the ￿nancial markets,
as well as the total level of production in the economy.
When moving towards integration agents in country 1 have strong incentives to invest in
risky activities, since these activities are now more pro￿table with respect to safe investments
in bonds; they invest more in production capital, since their relative risk aversion decreases.
Country 1 therefore experiences an increase in wealth dispersion that, at the new steady state,
reaches 0.43% of its autarky wealth standard deviation. In country 2 on the contrary, after
10￿CA = ￿S ￿ ￿I, therefore the investment positions in the panel should be interpreted with a minus
sign.
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Figure 1.12: Wealth distribution in autarky
Figure 1.13: Wealth distribution in integration steady state when limited liability becomes
binding for country 1.
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Figure 1.14: Hicksian equivalent variation
integration, agents prefer safer activities therefore they increase their investment in foreign
bonds and decreases the exposition to productivity shocks. Wealth dispersion decreases by
0.17% of wealth standard deviation at the steady state of integration. Accumulation of
bonds at the country level produces a shift in wealth distribution until the limited liability
constraint becomes binding for country 1. Figure 1.13 reports the wealth distribution at
the integration steady state when bonds reach their lower bound in country 1 and aggregate
wealth is zero (in the picture it coincides with the wealth of agents in the ￿fth decile).
The increasing inequality for country 1 is consistent with the data on wealth distribution
registered in the US in recent years.
We analyze the welfare consequences of integration by computing the Hicksian equivalent
variation for the two economies overall and inside each country for agents with di⁄erent
levels of wealth, at the moment of ￿nancial integration. The Hicksian equivalent variation
is de￿ned as the percentage increase in consumption at time zero that makes the agent as
well o⁄in autarky as with integration. A positive value then means that agents are better of
with integration, a negative value instead says that integration as negative impact on agents





) ￿ 1 (1.33)
11We use the de￿nition employed in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
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Figure 1.14 and 1.15 show the Hicksian equivalent variation inside the two countries for
agents with di⁄erent levels of wealth. In ￿gure 1.14 in particular x-axis scales are di⁄erent
because, as mentioned before, country 2 wealth is more dispersed than country 1￿ s. Figure
1.15 reports instead wealth deciles, to show the impact of integration on di⁄erent income-
groups. In country 1 integration has a positive welfare impact for the overall mass of agents,
however gains are high for very poor people and decrease as agents wealth increases, until
they reach negative values for the upper part of the distribution. The risk free interest
rate is the main cause of such di⁄erent reactions. The poor people experience welfare gains
since in integration the interest paid on their accumulated debt drops so they can consume
more. The contrary is trues for the very rich since the interest they receive on their ￿nancial
activities falls. The entire population experiences an increase in consumption in the ￿rst
period, as highlighted above, so on average the population of country 1 is better o⁄ with
integration.
In country 2 poorer agents have to pay higher interests on their debt after integration,
therefore their welfare conditions worsen. Richer people instead receive higher returns on
their bonds, therefore are better o⁄. The overall result is however negative, since for the
whole population, the new economic conditions push agents to postpone consumption to the
future.
Figure 1.16 reports the Hicksian decomposition of integration e⁄ects in the two countries
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Figure 1.16: Hicksian decomposition - ￿rst period
and nine deciles in the ￿rst period of integration. The upper-left panel simply shows the
percentage change in consumption do to a move from autarky to integration. As expected
agents in country 1 increase their consumption, but the e⁄ect is stronger for the poor deciles
of the population, as explained above. In country 2 the population experiences a generalized
drop in consumption, and the e⁄ect is again stronger for the poorest. Welfare e⁄ects are
de￿ned now as the additional consumption in every future period that makes agents as well
o⁄ in autarky as with integration and are reported in the upper-right panel of ￿gure 1.16.
The result is analogous to the one presented in ￿gure 1.15, but is lower in magnitude since
the gains/losses are distributed along all periods after integration.
The substitution e⁄ect is decomposed in the lower panels. The substitution e⁄ect rep-
resents the impact of changes in prices on consumption decisions. It can be additionally
decomposed into the impact of changes in the interest rate and the impact of variation in
the cost of production activities. The lower-left panel shows that in country 1 the drop in
the interest rate pushes all agents to consume more due to a lower precautionary motive at
the new interest rate. The e⁄ect of production costs is instead negative on consumption: the
pressure on the marginal return di⁄erential with respect to the risk free interest rate pushes
agents to invest more in risky activities and therefore consume less.
The opposite is true in country 2. Agents are induced to consume less and accumulate
more savings at the new interest rate. They, however, also have incentives to consume more
instead of accumulating more capital, since the risk-adjusted capital returns are now too
high compared with the returns on foreign bonds.
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1.6 Financial crisis
We now turn our attention to the e⁄ects of the ￿nancial crisis on the main variables of
interest examined in the previous section. Before any consequences on the real economy,
the immediate e⁄ects of the ￿nancial crisis are worsened ￿nancial conditions and less secure
capital markets. As showed in the second section, the risk premium for investing in risky
activities increased in all countries between 2007 and 2008: in the US, the interest rate
adjusted for the risk premium moved from 4.79% to 5%, while in the rest of the world
the increase is stronger, so the gap over the US position moved from 1.6% to 2.6%. Two
parameters need therefore to be calibrated to account for the e⁄ects of the crisis on the
￿nancial market development.
Parameter values - ￿nancial crisis
￿A1 uninsured idiosyncratic production shock st. dev., US 0.94
￿A2 uninsured idiosyncratic production shock st. dev., RoW 1.2
In line with estimates of the proxy for ￿nancial liberalization, KAOPEN, plotted in
section 2, we consider that around 1994, there was a boost in ￿nancial integration. In the
simulations below we consider that, in the ￿rst period, the two economies are in autarky.
Then they ￿nancially integrate without pre-announcement and for the subsequent three
periods, 15 years, they are in the situation illustrated in section 5. In the ￿fth period, the
￿nancial crisis worsens the ￿nancial institutions in both economies, bringing about higher
risk associated with investment in production activities.
1.6.1 Aggregate movements
Figures 1.17 and 1.18 report the results of the simulations. As illustrated before, after
￿nancial integration the two economies reach an interest rate between the values of autarky.
The e⁄ect of the ￿nancial crisis, as illustrated for the closed economy, is to lower the in-
terest rate to a new common level in which both countries optimally decide to reduce their
production activities, since now the risk premium associated with risky capital increases
in both economies.12 The overall result is capital accumulation in country 1 for the ￿rst
three periods, as illustrated above, and smooth decumulation for the subsequent periods up
to the new steady state, that is however higher than the autarky initial capital level. In
12The new level of interest rate is between the two levels of autarky interest rate but with worsened
￿nancial conditions, in line with proposition 1.
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Figure 1.17: Capital account liberalization and ￿nancial crisis in period 5.
country 1 capital decumulation is mitigated by the integration with another economy that
experiences worse ￿nancial turmoil. In country 2 the ￿nancial crisis exacerbates the already
negative accumulation of capital with a substantial drop due to two forces that point in
the same direction of discouraging risky investments: new internal ￿nancial conditions and,
more importantly, the larger gap with the other economy.
Consumption in country 1 experiences ￿rst an increase, as illustrated in the lower-right
panel of ￿gure 1.17, due to more impatient agents, the second increase in period 5 is due
again to even stronger willingness to anticipate consumption at the new interest rate. Finally
consumption of agents in country 1 needs to decrease due to the burden of the interests on
the accumulated debt that needs to be paid. Agents in country 2 on the other hand decide to
postpone consumption in the ￿rst three periods, as illustrated above, due to precautionary
savings. This motive is even stronger with the worsened ￿nancial conditions, and a larger
gap in ￿nancial development with respect to the partner economy. Therefore overall agents
experience a further and more dramatic reduction in their consumption level. Eventually
they will experience higher consumption in the future driven by positive interests earned on
￿nancial activities.
Net exports of country 2 towards the US experience ￿rst an increase due to integration
and then a second one as a consequence of changes in the precautionary savings motive of
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Figure 1.18: Capital account liberalization and ￿nancial crisis in period 5.
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agents in the two countries, as described above. Country 2 starts immediately acquiring
country 1￿ s issued debt, and the ￿nancial crisis increases the speed of this accumulation.
Factor payments follow the increasing burden of the US debt and experience an acceleration
after the ￿nancial crisis even if the equilibrium interest rate decreases.
The US current account drops after ￿nancial integration and experiences a more dra-
matic decrease after the ￿nancial crisis, reaching a de￿cit of 14% of production. Two periods
after that, in period 6, ￿nally it becomes positive. With ￿nancial integration, the invest-
ment component of the US current account decreases, so there is a positive variation in risky
capital. Three periods after, as a consequence of the ￿nancial crisis, capital in country 1
decumulates, so the investment position improves. Country 2 instead experiences two con-
tractions in the investment choice, where the second is more dramatic than the ￿rst. When
country 2 is hit by the ￿nancial crisis the e⁄ect on capital accumulation (underinvestment) is
so strong that the saving variation experiences a drop, and then a steady decrease. Country
1 instead has negative and growing saving variations after integration and as a consequence
of the ￿nancial crisis; it then moves to positive positions 35 years after integration.
1.6.2 Welfare analysis
We now investigate the welfare consequences of the ￿nancial crisis. In line with section
5.3 we compute the Hicksian equivalent variation, de￿ned as the consumption that makes
agents indi⁄erent between the levels of consumption reached three periods after integration
and integration with ￿nancial crisis.
Figures 1.19 and 1.20 report the welfare gains in the two countries. In particular ￿gure
1.19 shows the gains for agents with di⁄erent levels of wealth. In country 1 all agents decide
to increase current consumption since they become more impatient; they also experience a
drop in their production activities due to the crisis. The very poor agents are better o⁄since
they experience a drop in the level of interest rates due to the crisis, that makes them enjoy
higher consumption; the richers are instead worse o⁄ since they gain lower interests on the
accumulated activities. In country 2 instead all agents decide to postpone consumption and
also produce less. They experience welfare losses with no large di⁄erences for di⁄erent levels
of wealth. The positive e⁄ects of a lower interest rate are not relevant for agents in country
2 compared with the two strong e⁄ects illustrated.
Figure 1.20 highlights di⁄erent gains at di⁄erent wealth deciles. Here it is important to
notice that the median-mean US citizens experiences welfare losses, as well as the one in the
rest of the world, therefore the overall welfare consequences are negative in both countries.
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256361.6. FINANCIAL CRISIS 34
Figure 1.19: Hicksian equivalent variation - ￿nancial crisis
Figure 1.20: Hicksian equivalent variation - ￿nancial crisis
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Figure 1.21: Response to capital account liberalization - ￿ = :3
1.7 Sensitivity analysis
This section reports the result of the quantitative analysis with di⁄erent parametrizations
of the two economies. In particular in the ￿rst part we show that changes in the income
share of capital and the annual discount rate do not a⁄ect the transition to the integration
steady state.
Figure 1.21 and 1.22 reports the simulated transition from the autarky steady state to in-
tegration with a di⁄erent value for the income share of capital: ￿ = :3: The dynamics toward
the new steady state do not change. The impact of liberalization on the two components of
the current account are slightly stronger in both countries.
Figures 1.23 and 1.24 report instead the transition dynamics of the two economies toward
the integration steady state when agents are more impatient (1￿￿ = :05). Again there are no
di⁄erences in the response of the main variables with respect to the benchmark speci￿cation.
The interest rate of equilibrium in autarky and then in integration is higher, and the share
of consumption on GDP is always higher. The current account de￿cit of country 1 is higher
in this case, and it is due to higher savings variation while the impact on investment decision
remains the same.
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Figure 1.22: Response to capital account liberalization - ￿ = :3:
Figure 1.23: Response to capital account liberalization - 1 ￿ ￿ = :05:
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Figure 1.24: Response to capital account liberalization - 1 ￿ ￿ = :05:
1.8 Final remarks
The present analysis provides a novel explanation on how ￿nancial development dif-
ferences can shape international portfolio choices. We shed light on the role of ￿nancial
development in simultaneously a⁄ecting consumers￿saving preferences as well as entrepre-
neurial investment decisions. These two e⁄ects have important implications for the countries￿
variables in equilibrium: countries with poor ￿nancial institutions have a lower capital accu-
mulation and lower interest rate, and ￿nancial liberalization exacerbates the underinvestment
condition of those economies. We focus on the long run implications of the impact of ￿nan-
cial liberalization on countries￿savings and investment decisions; we stress the importance
of structural di⁄erences among countries in determining, in equilibrium, increasing positive
or negative net assets positions. In a two - country model were the two economies di⁄er only
in their ability to insure ￿rms against their idiosyncratic shocks, we are able to reproduce
￿nancial global imbalances observed in the data: large and rising current account de￿cit for
the ￿nancially more advanced economy (in the calibration it is the US), accumulation of
the risk-free assets for the rest of the world. Our model provides quantitative evidence that
￿nancial integration among economies with di⁄erent ￿nancial development can harm emerg-
ing countries since in these economies integration dampens capital accumulation, boosts
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precautionary savings and reduces welfare. It also increases wealth inequality in ￿nancially
more developed economies.
The present work stresses the unambiguously positive e⁄ects of improvements in ￿nancial
market institutions to promote capital accumulation, contrary to the results obtained by
Aiyagari (1994) of higher capital levels in equilibrium for less ￿nancially advanced economies.
Moreover, in line with the recent empirical literature, we question the positive direct e⁄ects
of ￿nancial globalization for countries with weak ￿nancial markets.
Finally the present work contributes to the debate on the e⁄ects of the ￿nancial crisis: it is
￿rst of all able to show that worsening ￿nancial conditions cause global recession by increasing
the risk-adjusted cost of investing in production activities. The welfare consequences of this
shock are negative for all economies involved. We then go one step further to explain the long
run implications of the ￿nancial turmoil. Our model predicts that poorer economies, already
integrated with ￿nancially more advanced countries, su⁄er a further reduction in production
activities and an even stronger precautionary saving motive. Their capital therefore goes
abroad towards foreign risk-free activities. On the contrary ￿nancial integration mitigates
the real e⁄ects of the crisis on richer economies, under-investment is reduced by the large
drop in the interest rate, and agents still want to anticipate their consumption. Overall these
countries experience negative and growing net foreign asset positions.
This analysis is not able to capture the slight recovery of the current account de￿cit and
savings registered in recent US data. This is due mainly to two features of the model: no
borrowing constraints and no possibility of default for single agents. As already mentioned
however, ours is an analysis of the long run implications and we believe that while the current
data might re￿ ect short run reactions to the recession, there are no signs of changes in agents￿
preferences with respect to the pre-crisis period.
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1.9 Appendix A
Agents￿budget constraint (equation 3) can be re-written in the following way:
cit + kit+1 + bit+1 + ￿t￿t = wit (2￿ )
Where the term ￿t = (￿m;t)
Mi
m=1 is a portfolio of Mi risky ￿nancial assets and ￿t =
(￿m;t)
Mi
m=1 is the associated price vector. Agents of country i can invest in those assets in
order to maximize their utility. In each period wealth is given by:
wit = ~ Aitk
￿
it + (1 + rit)bit + (1 ￿ ￿)kit + dt￿t￿1 (3￿ )
Where dt+1 = (dm;t)
Mi
m=1 is the vector of payo⁄s of the ￿nancial assets that are jointly
normal, independent and with expected value Etdt+1 = 0: ~ Ait is the productivity shock,
distributed as a normal (1;￿2
~ A); ￿2
~ A in this representation is the total variance associated
with the idiosyncratic production risk.
Agents choose the optimal level of risky activities ￿t as to minimize the variance of their
wealth: the optimal portfolios are able to fully hedge the diversi￿able idiosyncratic risk,
leaving agents with a residual undiversi￿able risk with variance ￿2
iA = V ar(wit) < ￿2
~ A. We
can assume that the idiosyncratic production risks are identically distributed in the two
countries, while the number of assets available Mi varies; Mi gives the dimension of ￿nancial
market development in each country i, the higher the number of assets available, the lower
is the residual production risk consumers-entrepreneurs have to face.
1.10 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: Given the monotonicity of the R - K relationship in the ￿rm￿ s
investment demand at the steady state:







One and only one level of capital choice in each of the two countries corresponds to any
level of interest rate r.
We now need to prove that the interest rate, rss, is r2 < rss < r1: If rss was larger
than country 1 steady state interest rate, rss ￿ r1, agents of country 1 would like to have a
non-decreasing consumption path, and agents of country 2 an increasing consumption path
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(since r2 < r1), this would bring about total positive consumption growth in the steady state
that cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore it has to be that rss < r1:
If rss ￿ r2 then agents of country 1 would like to have a decreasing consumption path
(since r2 < r1) and agents in country 2 a non-increasing consumption path. The only way to
anticipate consumption is by issuing bonds (since capital is constant at the steady state), but
the two countries cannot contemporaneously have respectively a negative and a non-positive
bond position since the market for bonds has to clear in equilibrium. Therefore it has to be
that r2 < rss < r1, country 1 holds a negative foreign asset position and country 2 a positive
one. Country 1 keeps accumulating debt until its aggregate wealth reaches zero.
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The textbook neoclassical growth model predicts that countries with lower capital stock
bene￿t from capital account liberalization since integration increases the speed of convergence
through the equalization of returns on capital. In the present analysis we show that, in the
medium term, ￿nancial integration can reduce capital accumulation in developing countries
with poor ￿nancial institutions, because of a high risk premium in production activities. In
the long run, however, integration brings higher capital than in the autarky steady state. The
contrary happens for ￿nancially advanced economies: they enjoy a period of capital growth
in the ￿rst years after integration, but in the long run they experience a reduction in capital
compared to their autarky steady state. Two forces drive these results: precautionary saving
and the propensity to move resources from risky capital to safe assets until the risk-adjusted
return on capital equalizes the risk-free interest rate; under the maintained assumption of
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, those forces are both decreasing in
wealth. Overall, ￿nancial integration is welfare improving for ￿nancially advanced economies
and welfare decreasing for developing countries.
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2.1 Introduction
Standard neoclassical growth models predict that all economies conditionally converge
to their steady state and that ￿nancial integration - through the equalization of the marginal
return of capital across countries - accelerates the convergence rate of those scarce in capital.
The role assigned to ￿nancial integration has recently been subject to close scrutiny: on
one side, a wide range of empirical evidence has not been able to give a univocal answer
on the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on growth; on the other hand this literature stresses
that, besides transitory e⁄ects on accumulation, capital account liberalization could impact
countries￿long run performance.1 An important element seems to be able to discriminate the
e⁄ects of integration on growth: countries￿￿nancial market development.2 Recent contribu-
tions have shown that ￿nancial deepness, by shaping the savings and investment behavior
of individual agents, has important implications for capital movements among countries
and can help explaining the emergence of large external imbalances, as observed in the last
decades.
In this paper we argue that ￿nancial integration among countries at di⁄erent stages
of ￿nancial market development has sizeable transitory as well as permanent e⁄ects on
their capital levels. In particular, we confront a developing country that is still in the
process of accumulating capital and whose ￿nancial markets are at an early development
stage, and an advanced country that operates at the steady state and has more developed
￿nancial markets. We show that when these two economies open up their capital accounts,
in the short and medium term the developing country may experience a reduction in the
speed of capital accumulation and, therefore, in growth; in the long run, however, this
economy achieves steady state levels of capital and production that are higher than the ones
under autarky. The opposite is true for the advanced economy: here ￿nancial integration
boosts capital accumulation in the short and medium term; in the long run however, this
result is o⁄set by a decrease in the level of capital and production towards steady state
values that are below those of autarky. At the time of liberalization agents in the advanced
economy enjoy higher consumption and therefore positive welfare gains, while agents in the
poorer country experience a welfare loss. However this negative consequence is partially
mitigated if the developing country is at an early stage of capital accumulation. In the
￿rst years after integration, high consumption and investment in the advanced economy are
1See Kose, Prasad, Rogo⁄ and Wei (2009) for a survey on the empirical literature. Aghion et al. (2005)
empirically ￿nd that countries with poor ￿nancial markets converge to a steady state level of capital lower
than economies with better institutions; moreover Fung (2009) shows that countries with under-developed
￿nancial sectors are more likely to be trapped in poverty.
2For example Bon￿glioli (2008) ￿nds that ￿nancial depth boosts capital accumulation.
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￿nanced by capital in￿ ows; the accumulation of external debt, however, forces this country
to reduce both consumption and the capital stock in the long run. Finally, the short and
medium term implications depend on the amount of accumulated capital at the moment
of integration, while the long run consequences of ￿nancial integration only depend on the
￿nancial development gap.
We present a two-country model based on Angeletos (2007). In each economy hetero-
geneous agents are subject to idiosyncratic production shocks; the presence of idiosyncratic
risk generates a wedge between the risk-free interest rate and the marginal return on capital
(risk premium). Domestic ￿nancial markets provide partial insurance against those shocks.3
Better ￿nancial institutions, by lowering the portion of shocks that rests on agents, imply
a lower risk premium and lesser need for precautionary savings; in equilibrium, this results
in a higher risk-free interest rate and, at the same time, a higher level of capital. The two
countries di⁄er not only in terms of ￿nancial deepness, but also by the level of accumulated
capital: we assume that the advanced economy has already reached the autarky steady state,
while the other is still in the process of accumulating capital. When these two countries lib-
eralize their capital accounts (they can therefore exchange risk-free bonds) the interest rate
on bonds is immediately equalized at a level that is between the interest rates prevailing be-
fore integration. As a consequence of integration, in the medium term agents in the poorer
economy tend to postpone consumption and risky investment and buy safe assets issued
by the advanced country; agents in the latter, instead, prefer to raise consumption and the
capital stock.4 The e⁄ect is a deceleration of convergence in the developing economy, while
for the other country there is a tendency to move resources to risky activities (the exact path
for the two levels of capital in the short run depends on the level of accumulated capital
at the moment of integration). The developed country keeps accumulating external debt
up to the new steady state, where capital, production and consumption end up lower than
they were under autarky. The opposite is true for the developing economy: here agents keep
accumulating external assets, and in the new steady state reach levels of capital, production
and consumption higher than those corresponding to the autarky steady state.
Two forces drive these results: precautionary saving and the propensity to move resources
from risky capital to safe assets until the risk-adjusted return on capital is equal to the
risk-free interest rate; under the maintained assumption of constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility functions, those forces are both decreasing in wealth. Debt accumulation by
3We follow Angeletos and Calvet (2006) and Angeletos (2007) for the speci￿cation of the ￿nancial markets.
4Depending on the level of the risk-free interest rate in the emerging country before integration, agents
in this economy may experience a short-lived boost in consumption and capital accumulation.
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the agents in the advanced country, by reducing their willingness to take on risk, depresses
the steady state aggregate capital stock and production. In the developing country, in
contrast, the accumulation of wealth boosts the propensity to take on risk, resulting in
higher capital, production and consumption in the long run. Welfare analysis reveals that
these long run developments do not compensate for the medium term dynamics: ￿nancial
integration implies welfare losses for the developing country and gains for the advanced one.5
Two contributions are particularly close to the present analysis: Angeletos and Panousi
(2010) and Corneli (2009). We share with those papers the idea that ￿nancial underde-
velopment in￿ uences entrepreneurial activities and constrains the ability of the agents to
insure against idiosyncratic shocks.6 Moreover they also analyze the implications of ￿nan-
cial integration between two economies with di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial deepness. However,
while they focus on two countries that are at the autarkic steady state at the time of in-
tegration, we allow for the economy with less developed ￿nancial markets to be still in a
transition phase. This way, we are able to assess the e⁄ects of integration on the speed of
convergence of developing economies at di⁄erent stages of capital accumulation, therefore
providing novel implications for the short and medium run e⁄ects of capital account liber-
alization. In their contemporaneous and independent work, Angeletos and Panousi (2010)
establish the same important result for the steady state of integration that we also obtain:
lower capital, production and consumption with respect to the autarky levels for a ￿nan-
cially developed economy, and higher capital, production and consumption for a ￿nancially
poorer country with respect to its autarky steady state. The long run e⁄ects of ￿nancial
integration contrast, instead, with Corneli (2009), where capital account liberalization in the
long run brings to lower capital accumulation in the developing economy and higher in the
other country. The main di⁄erence is in the agents￿attitude towards risk; due to constant
absolute risk aversion, in Corneli (2009) capital choice is independent of the level of agents￿
wealth; large and widening bond holdings therefore do not a⁄ect the level of capital and
production, but only the saving-consumption decision. In the present paper, instead, as well
as in Angeletos and Panousi (2010), constant relative risk aversion makes optimal capital
dependent on wealth.
The welfare consequences of ￿nancial integration in the present paper are analogous to
Corneli (2009): ￿nancial integration brings welfare gains for the agents in the advanced
economy, where lower precautionary motive boosts consumption in the ￿rst periods after
5As mentioned above, welfare losses are larger the closer the developing country is to its autarky steady
state, at the moment of the integration.
6Analogously to the present work, these two papers adopt the formalization of the ￿nancial market
development introduced by Angeletos and Calvet (2006).
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256362.1. INTRODUCTION 48
capital account liberalization, and welfare losses for the developing economy. Mendoza et al.
(2007, 2009) reach similar conclusions in terms of welfare but with a di⁄erent approach: in
their analysis, production activities are not risky, and the only source of idiosyncratic risk is
labor income, following Aiyagari (1994).
The so far mentioned contributions, in line with the present work, are able to replicate
the global imbalances observed in the data, and explain them as a result of di⁄erences in
savings and investment attitudes. Other studies establish analogous results but focusing on
economies hit by aggregate risks (e.g. Caballero et al., 2008, Prades and Rabitsch, 2009,
Fogli and Perri, 2006).
Our analysis is also related to the contributions of Carroll and Jeanne (2009) and Sandri
(2010): both these papers ￿nd that ￿nancial integration reduces the speed of capital ac-
cumulation for ￿nancially underdeveloped economies. However they focus on a small open
economy, therefore they are not interested in the two sides of global imbalances; moreover
in their analyses the interaction between ￿nancial underdevelopment and capital account
liberalization has no impact on the steady state level of capital and consumption.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2010) study the welfare
consequences of capital account liberalization for a small open economy that is converging
towards its steady state.7 They ￿nd positive welfare gains for the country; those gains are
higher for an economy that liberalizes its capital account at an early stage of capital accumu-
lation. The driving force is that, at the moment of integration, the marginal productivity of
capital (which coincides with the risk-free interest rate) is higher that the world interest rate;
moreover in Antunes and Cavalcanti (2010) the borrowing constraint becomes looser with
lower interest rates, therefore the e⁄ect of integration is an increase in consumption, capital
and net borrowing. We share with these studies the fact that ￿nancial integration has better
e⁄ects for countries at an early stage of capital accumulation than for economies closer to
their steady state, however we always obtain welfare losses for the developing country. The
main di⁄erence is that in our setup, after capital account liberalization, the risk premium
for investing in production activities induces agents of the developing country to reduce the
speed of capital accumulation. Also in our two-country world, the gap in the precautionary
savings (higher in the developing country with respect to the rest of the world) determines
an equilibrium interest rate at which the developing economy is a net lender, since its agents
tend to postpone consumption and increase savings.
Finally our results are in line with the empirical ￿ndings of Reinhart and Rogo⁄(2010):
7In Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) ￿nancial markets are complete, while in Antunes and Cavalcanti (2010)
heterogeneous agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their labor income, ￿ la Aiyagari.
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they estimate that high levels of debt (above 90%) are associated with lower growth. In
our simulations we ￿nd that the ￿nancially advanced economy starts shrinking its level
of production for values of debt above 70%. We obtain therefore that widening global
imbalances are not neutral for countries￿long run performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical
model and derive the steady state in the two cases of autarky and ￿nancial integration. In
section 3 we calibrate the model to study the transition path towards the steady state
of integration and the implications in terms of convergence rate and welfare for the two
economies. We moreover show the results of the simulations with a di⁄erent hypothesis on
the level of capital accumulation in the ￿nancially less advanced economy, at the moment of
integration. Section 4 concludes with some ￿nal remarks and way forward.
2.2 The model
The model we present is based on Angeletos (2007). It is a neoclassical economy with
heterogeneous agents, convex technologies and idiosyncratic production risks. Financial
markets are incomplete and agents can trade only riskless bonds. Wealth can be allocated
either to consumption, risky productive capital or risk free bonds. Time is discrete; there
are two countries indexed with i, each populated by a continuum of atomistic agents.8 Each
household is a consumer - entrepreneur, owns a ￿rm, and supplies inelastically one unit of
labor in a competitive labor market; on the other hand she can accumulate capital only in
her own ￿rm.9







i;t =(1 ￿ ￿) (2.1)
We assume a standard CRRA utility function, where ￿ > 0 represents the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion (and the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and
ci;t is the chosen level of consumption at time t by an individual agent living in country i.
Each period the agent allocates her wealth wit to consumption cit, capital kit+1, to be
used in the production of the ￿nal good the period after, and risk-free bonds bit+1, according
8Small letters represent single agents￿variables, while capital letters are aggregate variables.
9Alternatively we could think of each "agent￿ s unit" as a couple, one of them owning a ￿rm, the other
being a worker.
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to the budget constraint:
cit + kit+1 + bit+1 = ￿it + Ritbit + !it ￿ wit (2.2)
Total wealth is given by the pro￿t earned by the household-entrepreneur ￿it, the gross
return Rit on the bonds bit purchased the period before and the wage !it.
Pro￿ts are given by total production less labor costs:






it + (1 ￿ ￿)kit (2.4)
and
ai;min = 0; Eait = 1, lnait ￿ N(￿￿2
ia=2;￿2
ia)
The production is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of capital and labor nit. Capital is chosen
one period in advance, it depreciates at a rate ￿ and cannot be reshu› ed once the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock ait realizes. The level of employed labor is instead decided after
observing the shock. ait is log-normally distributed with p.d.f. ￿, ait is i.i.d. across agents
and time. The parameter ￿2
ia; which is the variance of the associated normal distribution, is
the formalization of the ￿nancial market development. It represents the portion of the pro-
duction risk that cannot be insured through the ￿nancial market and, therefore, rests on the
individual entrepreneurs.10 Throughout the rest of the paper we maintain the assumption
that the variance of the idiosyncratic shock is lower in country 1 (the advanced economy,
with developed ￿nancial markets) and higher in country 2 (the developing country with less
developed ￿nancial markets).
Given the assumptions on the distribution of the shock, the model generates an endoge-
nous or "natural" borrowing constraint that must be satis￿ed in every period:






hit is the human wealth, computed as the discounted ￿ ow of wages; it also represents
the wealth of an agent subject to the worse productivity outcome in every period from t
10￿ is the short-cut for the level of production variability that cannot be insured. We therefore do not
make assumption on the "total" variability of the production process, and therefore we do not compare
this measure across countries. We are interested in the variability that stays on households, cannot be
redistributed, and therefore a⁄ects agents￿wealth.
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onwards (i.e. ai;t=ai;min = 0 8t). Since the labor market is competitive, in equilibrium the
agents are paid identical wages, therefore human wealth is the same across agents.
2.2.1 Optimization problem
Given a deterministic sequence of prices f!it;Rit+1g
1
t=0 , agents choose consumption,
labor supply, capital and risk-free bonds fcit;nit;kit+1;bit+1g
1
t=0 in order to maximize their
lifetime utility (1), subject to their budget constraint (2) and the non-negativity constraints
(see below).
The optimization problem for each agent can be written with a value function:
V (k;b;a;t) = max
n;c;b0;k0 fU(c) + ￿EtV (k
0;b
0;a




0 = ￿ + Rb + ! (2.7)
c ￿ 0;n ￿ 0;k0 ￿ 0;b0 ￿ ￿ht
Where, again
￿it = f(ait;kit;nit) ￿ !itnit (2.8)
Angeletos (2007) proves that the policy functions for consumption, capital and bonds
can be written as linear functions of ￿nancial wealth wit (see appendix A for derivation), in
particular:
cit = (1 ￿  it)(wit + hit) (2.9)
kit+1 =  it￿it(wit + hit) (2.10)
bit =  it(1 ￿ ￿it)(wit + hit) ￿ hit (2.11)





￿ rit+1 is the mean of the returns to risky capital across the agents, ￿2
it+1 their variance
that coincides with ￿2
ia, the variability of the idiosyncratic production shock.
The above equations de￿ne the equilibrium choices as a linear function of the e⁄ective
wealth, de￿ned as ￿nancial plus the human wealth (wit+ hit), multiplied by two coe¢ cients
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that are deterministic and vary with wage !it+1 and bond return Rit+1. The proportion
of wealth the agent decides to allocate to savings and investment ( it), therefore to future
consumption, is a function of the discount rate ￿ and of the return to savings; it in fact comes
from the Euler equation combined with the FOC for capital and bonds. The proportion of
stored resources that are invested in risky capital (￿it) is a measure of the risk premium
the agents receive for investing in the production activity instead of risk-free assets, and
is decreasing in the riskiness of the ￿nancial environment ￿2
ia: the higher is the portion of
production risk that cannot be insured through ￿nancial markets, the lower the amount of
resources invested in risky capital. It is also important to notice that ￿it is negatively a⁄ected
by the risk aversion parameter: the more the agent is risk averse (higher ￿), the lower the
amount of resources employed in risky activities.
2.2.2 General equilibrium and steady state under autarky
Since the policy functions for consumption, capital and bonds are linear in wealth, it
is possible to aggregate the equilibrium choices of cit;kit+1;bit+1; the wealth distribution
does not a⁄ect the aggregate dynamics. In addition, since the shock to productivity is
idiosyncratic, it cancels out in the aggregate, so that the general equilibrium is deterministic.
In the closed economy in every period bonds are in zero net supply since the market has to
clear; also, the o⁄er of labor equals its supply:
Bit = 0 (2.12)
Nit = 1 (2.13)
In what follows we assume that ￿ = 1, a plausible calibration for the parameter of relative
risk aversion that is widely used in the literature and allows to simplify the parameter that
de￿nes the propensity to consume, which reduces to  it = ￿. Aggregating across the agents,
the budget and the borrowing constraints (2) and (5) become:








, where !it = (1 ￿ ￿)K
￿
it (2.15)
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The policy functions (9) and (10) become:
Cit = (1 ￿ ￿)(Wit + Hit) (2.16)
Kit+1 = ￿￿it(Wit + Hit) (2.17)
The mean of the returns to capital simply becomes equal to the net marginal productivity
of capital, taking into account capital depreciation, (￿ rit+1 = ￿K
￿￿1
it+1 + 1 ￿ ￿) therefore the






The equilibrium path for capital accumulation is positively a⁄ected by the ￿nancial
market development: for any level of the e⁄ective wealth the share of resources invested in
capital is higher the lower is ￿2
ia.
The steady state versions of (14) - (17) are (given that Nit = 1 8t):
Ci + Ki = Wi = K
￿






Ci = (1 ￿ ￿)(K
￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)Ki + Hi) (2.20)
Ki = ￿￿i(K
￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)Ki + Hi) (2.21)
Figure 2.1 shows the steady state values of the main variables as function of ￿ia, which
is varied between zero and 1.1.11 Angeletos (2007) proves that, for plausible values of the
model parameters, capital and the risk-free interest rate are decreasing in ￿2
ia; which is
also the case in the ￿gure. The risk premium, measured by the gap between the marginal
return to capital and the risk-free interest rate, is increasing in the riskiness of production,
i.e. in the degree of ￿nancial market underdevelopment: this results both from an increase
in the risk compensation demanded for investing in the productive capital and from an
increase in the demand for precautionary savings, which drives down the risk-free interest
rate. Less developed ￿nancial markets are associated with a lower steady state capital level
and, therefore, with lower production, consumption and wages. It is worth noting that the
level of e⁄ective wealth decreases less rapidly than production, as it is smoothed by the fall
in the risk-free rate; it follows that the fall in consumption is also muted.
11The calibration of the parameters used in this simulation is reported below is section 3.1.
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Figure 2.1: The impact of uninsurable risks ￿ia on the steady state relations.
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Figure 2.2: Steady state demand and supply of capital in two countries with di⁄erent degree
of ￿nancial development.
The equations (18)-(21) can be combined to obtain the following:
K
1￿￿
i (￿ + 1 ￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿











Equation (22) derives from the Euler condition at the steady state of zero consumption
growth; it therefore represents the agents￿saving decision or the supply of capital to the
￿rms. This equation implies a positive relationship between the risk-free interest rate and
the capital stock: higher interest rates induce agents to postpone consumption and therefore
to devote more resources to saving - investment. Equation (23) represents, instead, the
demand for capital by the entrepreneurs, or their investment decision. Given decreasing
returns to capital, higher interest rates on risk free bonds imply lower levels of capital in
order to keep the return on capital adjusted for risk equal to the interest rate.
Equations (22) and (23) are plotted in ￿gure 2 for two countries that di⁄er only in their
level of ￿nancial development. The ￿gure provides a visual insight of the result that in the
autarky steady state deeper ￿nancial markets are associated with higher capital and higher
risk-free interest rate.
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2.2.3 Steady state with integrated ￿nancial markets
In this section we solve the model assuming that the two countries open up their cap-
ital accounts, i.e. they start exchanging risk-free bonds. Financial integration brings the
immediate equalization of the two countries￿risk-free interest rates. The individual agents￿
optimization problem is identical to the closed economy case, therefore conditions (9)-(11)
remain valid. The open economy case di⁄ers in that, when deriving the general equilibrium
and computing the aggregate equilibrium relationships, the condition that bonds are in zero
net supply in each country (equation (12)) need not be satis￿ed, and is replaced by the
condition that the world demand and supply of bonds are equal. The general equilibrium
is again deterministic, given the absence of aggregate shocks, and is characterized by the
sequence of consumption, labor supply, capital and risk-free bonds fCit;Nit;Kit+1;Bit+1g
1
t=0
and of prices f!it;Rt+1g
1
t=0 such that the following aggregate relationships are satis￿ed in
every period:
Cit + Kit+1 + Bit+1 = Wit ￿ K
￿
it + (1 ￿ ￿)Kit + RtBit (2.24)






Cit = (1 ￿ ￿)(Wit + Hit) (2.27)
Kit+1 = ￿￿it(Wit + Hit) (2.28)
Equation (24) is the analogous of the budget constraint (14) in the closed economy
case, except that here aggregate bond holdings can be non-zero. Equation (25) imposes
equilibrium in the world bond market. Equations (26) - (28) are identical to the closed
economy.
The following proposition establishes the steady state equilibrium result of the model
with ￿nancial integration among two countries.
Proposition 1: Suppose that in a two - country world, with country 1 ￿nancially more
developed than country 2, in the autarky steady states the risk-free interest rates are such
that R1 > R2. The steady state equilibrium with ￿nancial integration is characterized by a
common risk-free interest rate Rss, such that R2 < Rss < R1; and country 1 issues a strictly
positive level of risk free bonds.
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The steady state versions of (24)-(28) are:
Ci = K
￿
i ￿ ￿Ki + (Rss ￿ 1)Bi (2.29)






Ci = (1 ￿ ￿)(K
￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)Ki + RssBi + Hi) (2.32)
Ki = ￿￿i(K
￿
i + (1 ￿ ￿)Ki + RssBi + Hi) (2.33)
Equations (29)-(33) help to understand the novel result of the present analysis, that is in
contrast with previous studies (e.g. Mendoza et al, 2007, and Corneli, 2009). The levels of
consumption and capital, determined by the aggregation of the policy functions (equations
(32) and (33) respectively) are increasing functions of wealth, therefore they are increasing
in the steady state level of the bond holdings. In the advanced economy (country 1), capital
and consumption are lower now than in the autarky steady state, since this economy is net
issuer of bonds. The opposite is true of country 2: the levels of capital and consumption
are higher in the integration steady state than in the autarky steady state. The complete
dynamics of those variables are simulated in the next section.
Figure 2.3 gives a further visual representation of the movements of capital and the
interest rate: it shows the capital supply and demand curves for the two countries at the
steady state both in autarky and integration. Equilibria 1_a and 2_a are the autarky
interest rate - capital combinations respectively in country 1 and country 2, derived in the
previous section, while the equilibria with ￿nancial integration are indicated by 1_i and
2_i respectively. As stated in Proposition 1 the world interest rate is between the autarky
risk-free interest rates. The most important message from ￿gure 2.3 is that the steady state
level of capital in country 1 is smaller than its autarky level while the opposite is true of
country 2. By looking at ￿gure 2.3 we also see that the capital accumulated by agents in
country 2 always remains below the level in country 1; this happens because the ￿nancial
development gap generates a higher risk premium and higher precautionary savings in the
developing economy, even in the ￿nancial integration.
We obtain the surprising result that in the long run, the country with poor ￿nancial
institutions accumulates more capital than under autarky, while the advanced economy de-
cumulates capital and shrinks production. This novel result is induced by the di⁄erent
behavior of the supply and demand curves. Consider country 1. On the one hand, the
supply does not move, since the propensity to consume does not change after integration;
the only implication of being able to lend or borrow from abroad is a movement along the
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Figure 2.3: Steady state demand and supply of capital in two countries with di⁄erent degree
of ￿nancial development. Autarky and integration.
curve: the interest rate of integration, being lower than the one of autarky, induces agents
to reduce their savings and increase consumption. On the other hand, two distinct e⁄ects
in￿ uence the demand of capital. The ￿rst movement, in line with the supply side, is along
the courve: entrepreneurs in country 1 are willing to increase investment at the new interest
rate. The second movement is a shift of the demand curve due to changes in the propensity
to invest in risky activities: since agents have CRRA utility function, their risk aversion
increases with the decrease in wealth therefore they reduce their level of capital further. The
positive impact of a smaller risk-free interest rate on the demand of capital is therefore more
than o⁄set by the increase in the risk aversion. The opposite is true of the demand curve
in country 2: it moves to the right due to the higher propensity to invest in risky activities
that derives from the increase in wealth. Moreover, in this economy, agents are willing to
save more at the interest rate of integration which is higher than the one of autarkic steady
state.
2.3 Quantitative analysis
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In this section we calibrate the model and simulate the dynamics during the transition
towards the new steady state. In particular, the scope of this exercise is to highlight the
implications of ￿nancial integration for a developing country that is still in the process of
accumulating capital when it opens its capital account towards an economy ￿nancially more
advanced and which is already at its autarky steady state (country 1).
2.3.1 Calibration
Each period corresponds to one year. We calibrate 8 parameters in order to match some
important features of the data. We choose two blocks: on the one side the US, on the
other side the rest of the world. This is a conservative measure, since in this way we obtain
a ￿nancial development gap that is smaller than the one we would obtain considering for
the second block only non-OECD countries. Also, this way we can reproduce the path of
the US current account de￿cit and assess the e⁄ects that its increasing indebtedness may
have on growth. The model is however ￿ exible to di⁄erent characterizations of the two
economies. In order to be consistent with the representation of the two blocks (US - rest
of the world), we assume that the ￿rst country is smaller, it represents 30% of world GDP;
its weight is measured by the parameter ￿.12 Compared to the analytical representation, we
also introduce capital-adjustment costs in order to get smooth transition paths for capital
movements and to be consistent with our previous study (Corneli, 2009). We use a standard
quadratic form (￿(kit+1=Kit ￿ 1)2) for capital-adjustment costs as speci￿ed in Kehoe and
Perri (2002), making use of their calibration of the parameter ￿.
Parameter values
￿ income share of capital 0.36
1 ￿ ￿ annual discount rate 0.04
￿ annual capital depreciation rate 0.08
￿ annual capital adjustment cost 0.6
￿ risk aversion 1
￿1a st. dev. of uninsured idiosyncratic prod.shock, US .6
￿2a st. dev. of uninsured idiosyncratic prod.shock, RoW .9
￿ Country 1(US) share of total GDP 0.289
The income share of capital, the annual discount rate, the annual capital depreciation
rate and the parameter of relative risk aversion are taken from the literature. We obtain the
12The US represents around 29% of world GDP in 2007(Data surce: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)).
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values of the ￿nancial market development parameters by matching the risk premium of the
two blocks at the ￿nal steady state of integration. In particular, we use the data elaborated
by Damodaran for 2008 for the interest rate adjusted for risk (our measure of the marginal
return to capital).13 The estimated interest rate adjusted for risk is of 5% for the US and
7.6% for the rest of the world (therefore a gap over the US of 2.6%).
2.3.2 Simulations
In order to reproduce the dynamic transition from the initial equilibrium in the closed
economy to the steady state of integration we adopt the computational procedure proposed
by Mendoza et al. (2009): we solve the model backward, updating our guess on one variable
until all the policy functions and the resource constraints are satis￿ed in every period.
We ￿rst focus our attention on the transition path towards the autarky steady state for
the developing economy (country 2 in our analysis) starting from a given level of capital K0.
We then make the assumption that the same country, at K = K0; decides to open up its
capital account to an economy with more developed ￿nancial markets and which is already
at its autarky steady state. We compare the speed of convergence towards the two di⁄erent
steady states (autarky and integration) for country 2 and highlight the transition of the main
variables of interest for the two economies.
2.3.2.1 Autarky
Figure 2.4 reports the transition to the autarky steady state of the main variables in
country 2. The initial level of capital is set equal to 93% of the steady state level. The
transition is smooth and takes 35 years to complete.14 The interest rate declines and capital
increases while the risk premium follows a non-monotonic path: ￿rst it increases, then it
starts tightening as the interest rate gets very close to the steady state level. The risk
premium however always moves around its steady state value of 7.95%.
13See Corneli (2009) for a discussion on the use of the dataset constructed by Damodaran
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/) to formalize the ￿nancial market develop-
ment. For the second economy (the rest of the world), countries are weighted by their partecipation in
the international capital market (IFIGDP, from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).
14Without capital adjustment costs convergence would take 28 years.
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Figure 2.4: Country 2 - transition towards the steady state in autarky.
2.3.2.2 Integration
In all the following simulations, at time 1 the two countries are in autarky, at time 2 they
￿nancially integrate without pre-announcement. At the moment of ￿nancial integration the
interest rate on risk free bonds is equalized in the two economies. The transition towards the
￿nal steady state is extremely slow (it takes 470 periods). The level of capital accumulated by
country 2 at the time of the capital account liberalization crucially determines the transition
path in the short and medium run. Consistently with the above exercise we consider K0 to
be 93% of the autarky steady state level (K0 is moreover equal to 90% of the steady state
of integration).
Figure 2.5 compares the capital accumulation path for country 2 in autarky and inte-
gration in the ￿rst 35 periods. In the ￿rst two periods the two curves coincides (recall that
capital is set one period in advance). Then there is a jump in the level of capital chosen in
integration and capital goes above the level of autarky. In fact, in this scenario, at the time
of integration the interest rate moves to a value that is lower than the risk-free interest rate
of country 2 (see ￿gure 2.7); in this economy, agents are therefore willing to invest in risky
activities, because the return to capital adjusted for risk is above the risk-free interest rate.
The boost in capital accumulation is however short-lived; after 5 years the level of capital
moves below the one of autarky. Agents in country 2 can now diversify their portfolios by
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Figure 2.5: Capital accumulation in country 2 for the ￿rst 34 years after integration - autarky
vs integration.
accumulating (on aggregate) positive levels of bonds, and they do so as they are more risk
averse than agents in country 1. The novel result of the present analysis is that ￿nancial
integration may boost capital accumulation in the very short time because of positive and
high di⁄erentials of returns on capital between the two countries, even when adjusted for risk;
however the implications of di⁄erent savings and investment behaviors have longer lasting
consequences in that they slow down convergence for more than 40 periods.
In fact, from ￿gure 2.6 it emerges that only 50 years after ￿nancial integration (instead
of 35 in the autarky regime) agents in country 2 reach a level of capital equal to the autarky
steady state. From that point on, they keep accumulating capital until they get to the steady
state level, which is 2.5% higher than the autarky one.
As mentioned above the very long run result is positive for this economy in terms of ￿nal
level of capital independently of the variables at the moment of integration: the ￿nal steady
state depends only on the combination of parameters of the two economies and in particular
on the ￿nancial development gap.
Figure 2.7 shows the behavior of the variables of interest in the ￿rst 34 years after
integration.15 At the moment of integration the interest rate immediately jumps to a common
15The intrest rate is expressed as a percentage rate per year; the capital is reported over the initial level
of capital and the same for production, while consumption, current account and bonds are reported as a
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Figure 2.6: Capital accumulation in country 2 in the long run - autarky vs integration.
intermediate level; it then moves to the steady state level in about 28 years16. The risk-free
interest rate di⁄erential before integration determines the short time reaction of the other
variables: in the present scenario at time 1 country￿ s 2 risk-free interest rate is higher than
the interest rate of integration (i.e. higher than country 1￿ s interest rate).17 At the time
of capital account liberalization agents in country 2 are willing to invest more resources in
their risky activity, since the return on capital adjusted for risk turns out to be higher than
the new interest rate; this boosts capital accumulation as illustrated above. The opposite
happens in the other economy: on impact agents in country 1 decreases the level of capital,
because the return on capital adjusted for risk is lower than the new risk-free interest rate;
they go back to the autarky level in 5 years (as interest rate decreases towards the steady
state level which is below country 1 autarky level) and then keep accumulating capital that
in 22 years reaches a value that is 1.3% higher than the autarky level. Also at the time of
integration agents in country 1 reduces the level of consumption, but only for the ￿rst period;
percentage of current domestic production.
16When the two countries are both at the autarky steady state at the moment of ￿nancial integration, the
interest rate jumps immediately to the new steady state, since capital liberalization induces only a capital
reshu› e, in line with the results obtained in Corneli (2009). The result is very close to the one analysed in
section 3.4, where K0 is 99% of the autarky steady state level.
17On the contrary if the risk-free interest rate of country 1 is lower than the new common level, agents
in this country move resources from risky activities to safe foreign bonds, decumulating capital (this second
case, with country￿ s 2 interest rate below the one of integration is presented in section 3.4).
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Figure 2.7: Transition dynamics - ￿rst year in autarky then ￿rst 34 years of integration.
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then the lower precautionary motive, with respect to the other economy, induces them to
increase the level of consumption and to ￿nance it by issuing debt. The current account
therefore ￿rst jumps to a surplus of 9% of production for country 1, followed by a jump to
a de￿cit of 6% of its GDP, which subsequently starts shrinking and turns again positive as
the debt service rises. Agents in country 1 keep issuing debt in the entire transition until it
reaches almost 400% of production at the ￿nal steady state. Due to the large increase in the
negative asset position, total wealth decreases and therefore consumption and capital, that
are a fraction of wealth, decrease as well. On one hand, agents have to repay interests on the
accumulated debt; on the other hand, they become more risk-averse as total wealth decreases
(given CRRA preferences). These two forces, namely lower wealth and higher risk aversion,
push agents to reduce the level of capital, that at the ￿nal steady state is 5% lower than the
autarky level. The level of consumption falls back to the autarky steady state value in 25
years, it then keeps diminishing down to 17% below the autarky one. The turning point for
the level of debt is around 71% of production; having reached this level of debt, country 1
starts decumulating capital, broadly in line with Rehinart and Rogo⁄ (2010) prediction.
On the other hand, agents in country 2 keep accumulating capital: in the ￿rst part of
the transition this is due mainly to the decrease in the risk-free interest rate, which must be
matched by a decline of the risk-adjusted return on capital; in the second very long transition
phase, capital accumulation is driven by the increasing share of resources they want to invest
in risky activities. In the steady state of integration capital in country 2 is 2.5% higher than
its level in autarky steady state. At the moment of integration agents increase their level
of consumption given the lower interest rate on savings, they however start consuming less
already two years after integration, when they become willing to postpone consumption in
order to save and invest more; they get to the autarky steady state level of consumption in
32 years and then they steadily raise it up to a ￿nal steady state which is 7.2% higher than
the autarky steady state level. The current account of country 2 mirrors the one of the other
economy. Therefore a large de￿cit in the ￿rst period is followed by a persistent surplus (for
around 30 years); then the current account turns negative again as the level of debt service
by the other economy increases. The ￿nal level of accumulated foreign assets reaches almost
200% of total production.
Poor countries (in terms of capital level) enjoy a ￿rst boost in capital accumulation
and consumption, and also capital in￿ ows following capital account liberalization. The sign
of the capital account changes however after a few years. This result is in line with the
observations of Prasad et al. (2007), who show a tendency for this reversal: until the end of
the 1990￿ s capital importing countries were the poorer economies, while in the last decade
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richer economies tended to attract net ￿ ows of capital.
2.3.3 Welfare analysis
We now turn our attention to the welfare consequences of ￿nancial integration. We com-
pute the Hicksian equivalent variation, de￿ned as the amount of consumption agents must
receive in order to remain in autarky instead of moving to integration; it therefore repre-
sents the amount of immediate consumption agents want at the moment of capital account
liberalization in order to be indi⁄erent between autarky and integration. A positive value
therefore means that the agent of this economy prefers to move to integration (integration is
welfare improving) while a negative value implies a higher utility from remaining in autarky
(integration is welfare decreasing).18
In the advanced country integration implies a positive welfare gain corresponding to
a 5.3% increase in immediate consumption. The temporary drop in consumption at the
moment of integration is more than o⁄set by consumption levels above the one of autarky
for the ￿rst 25 periods. Due to the discount factor ￿; agents in this economy assign low
weight to the decrease in consumption in the rest of the transition path.
The opposite is true for the agents in the developing country, where integration has a
negative welfare impact of 8% of consumption at time 1. The increase in the consumption
level at the time of integration cannot compensate for the decrease in the following years,
which is due to the strong precautionary motive.
The welfare implications of the model are sensitive to the initial level of capital in country
2 at the moment of integration. We show below, that the welfare consequences are worse for
developing economies with higher levels of capital at the moment of integration, since the
precautionary motive dominates over the equalization of the returns to capital adjusted for
risk. The contrary is also true: for example, if K0 is 69% of country 2 autarky steady state
(or 67% of the steady state of integration), the overall welfare loss is lower in this economy
and equal to 4.41%.
18We compute the Hicksian equivalent variation for the "average" agent, the one that, at the moment of
liberalization, has her wealth and accumulated capital and bonds equal to the average in that economy. This
measure is di⁄erent from the one used by Antunes and Cavalcanti (2010), who assume a benevolent planner
that averages across agents￿welfare. However given the monotonicity of the utility function the "sign" of
the welfare consequence is the same, even if the magnitude of the two measures is not comparable.
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Figure 2.8: Capital accumulation in country 2 for the ￿rst 19 years after integration - autarky
vs integration.
2.3.4 Alternative hypotheses on the level of initial capital K0
We now modify the initial value of capital for country 2 at the moment of ￿nancial
integration. We start from a value of K0 for country 2 that is 99% of the autarky level
and, more importantly, from a level of interest rate in country 2 slightly below the level of
integration in steady state (but still above the interest rate of autarkic steady state).
In ￿gure 2.8 we plot together capital accumulation in autarky and integration. The main
di⁄erence with respect to the scenario analyzed above is that here for country 2, capital
account liberalization reduces on impact the level of resources invested in risky activities by
almost 3%; the level of capital starts increasing again 5 years after integration and reaches
the initial level in about 25 years and the level of autarky steady state in 50 years. The
very long run implications are analogous to the ones exposed above (i.e. in country 2,
capital increases further and converges to a level higher than the autarkic steady state). The
important di⁄erence in this case is that at the moment of integration the risk-free interest
rate increases for agents in country 2, therefore they are willing to postpone consumption,
and to shift resources away from the risky and low pro￿table investment in capital (taking
into account the risk premium) into the now higher yielding risk-free bonds issued by country
1. In this scenario ￿gure 2.9 shows that the interest rate jumps to the steady state level upon
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Figure 2.9: Transition dynamics - ￿rst period in autarky, then ￿rst 33 periods of integration.
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integration and capital in country 1 starts increasing immediately, boosted by the lower risk
premium. The current account in country 2 jumps to a surplus of 3% of production. On the
other side, agents in country 1 are willing to issue debt in order to ￿nance consumption and
investment in capital, whose return adjusted for risk turns higher than the new lower risk-
free interest rate; in country 1 the current account decreases on impact by 7% of production.
At the time of integration, agents in country 2 decrease their level of consumption while
agents in the other economy increase consumption on impact; the medium and long run
paths for consumption are instead in line with the results of the previous scenario. The
welfare implications are therefore stronger than the previous scenario, with a 9% welfare
gain in terms of current consumption in country 1, and a 9% welfare loss for the agents of
the other economy.
2.4 Final remarks
The goal of the present analysis is to study the e⁄ects of integration among countries
with di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial market development. We ￿rst of all highlight that ￿nancial
deepness in￿ uences agents decisions in terms of investment as well as savings; in this respect
our analysis is in line with the empirical ￿ndings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009):19 we
obtain savings and investment gaps with respect to the complete markets case (that in the
present study is equivalent to assuming a production process with zero variance, ￿2
i).
We show that ￿nancial integration has negative welfare e⁄ects for ￿nancially poorer
economies, especially if those countries are close to their autarky steady state at the moment
of integration; this negative consequence is instead partially mitigated for countries that
are at an early stage of capital accumulation. On the other hand, integration is welfare
improving for ￿nancially advanced economies. In terms of capital accumulation the short
term e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration are very di⁄erent from the steady state ones. We establish
two important results: ￿rst, for economies with poor ￿nancial institutions, capital account
liberalization slows down the speed of capital convergence in the medium term, but in the
long run it results in a higher level of capital with respect to the autarkic steady state;
second, ￿nancially advanced economies enjoy a ￿rst period of higher investment in risky
activities, but in the very long run they reduce their capital (and, therefore, production)
to levels below the autarky steady state. Di⁄erent behaviors of savings and investment,
determined by di⁄erent appetite for risk, shape the choice of production, consumption and
19Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) are able to reproduce international capital movements and growth ob-
served in the data by introducing savings and investment wedges into the neoclassical growth model.
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safe investment. Moreover the propensity towards risky production activities decreases with
wealth, this mechanism determines the very long run levels of the main variables.
The novel result on the long run consequences of ￿nancial integration among economies
with di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development is in stark contrast with previous works: Men-
doza et al. (2007) and Corneli (2009) obtain the opposite long run results of steady state in
integration. A detailed comparison with them is needed but goes beyond the purpose of the
present study; it will be the object of future investigation.
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2.5 Appendix A
In what follows, for simplicity we drop the index i for the countries, which is attached to
every variable. Following Lemma 1 of Angeletos (2007), we obtain labor demand and capital
income as linear functions of kt; by maximizing ^ f(a;1; ^ n) with respect to ^ n:
nt = n(at;!t)kt (2.34)
￿t = r(at;!t)kt (2.35)
Where
^ f(at;1; ^ nt) = f(at;kt;nt)=kt
^ nt = nt=kt
The maximization problem reduces to:
V (w;t) = max
c;b0;k0 fU(c) + ￿EtV (w









0 + !t+1 (2.38)
We obtain the solution in equations (9) - (11) by proposing and verifying the following
solution:
V (w;t) = U(￿t(w + ht)) (2.39)
c(w;t) = (1 ￿  t)(w + ht) (2.40)
k(w;t) =  t(w + ht) (2.41)
b(w;t) = (1 ￿ ￿t) t(w + ht) ￿ ht (2.42)
Where the last is obtained by substituting (40) and (41) in the budget constraint (37).
For simplicity, we call r(at+1;!t+1) = rt+1:
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Combining these two expressions and substituting (wt+1 + ht+1) from the budget con-
straint we obtain an expression for ￿t = ￿(!t+1;Rt+1):
Et[(rt+1 ￿ Rt+1)((rt+1 ￿ Rt+1)￿t + Rt+1)
￿￿] = 0 (2.43)
From the envelope condition (V 0(w;t) = U0(c)) we obtain the following relation:
￿
1￿￿
t = (1 ￿  t)￿￿
Moreover summing the FOC above, pre-multiplied respectively by ￿t and (1 ￿ ￿t); we
have the recursive structure for the coe¢ cient  t:
(1 ￿  t)
￿1 = 1 + ￿
1=￿￿
1=￿￿1
t (1 ￿  t+1)
￿1 (2.44)
Where
￿t = Et[(rt+1 ￿ Rt+1)￿t + Rt+1)]
Finally ￿t and ￿t are approximated with a second-order Taylor expansion of ln￿t around
￿t = 0, by employing the derivation of the log - portfolio return in Campbell and Viceira
(2002):









￿ rit+1 = Etrt+1
Solving for ￿t and using the fact that Et(lnrt+1) = lnEt(rt+1) ￿ 1
2￿2
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RESERVE MANAGEMENT AND SOVEREIGN
DEBT COST IN A WORLD WITH LIQUIDITY
CRISES
This Chapter is joint work with Emanuele Tarantino.
Abstract
The accumulation of large amount of sovereign reserves has fuelled an intense debate
on the associated costs. In a world with liquidity crises and strategic default, we model a
contracting game between international lenders and a country, which delivers the country￿ s
optimal portfolio choice and the cost of sovereign debt: at equilibrium, the sovereign allocates
the borrowed resources to either liquid reserves or an illiquid and risky production project.
Moreover, we study how the opportunity cost of hoarding reserves is a⁄ected by the ￿nancial
and technological characteristics of the economy. In line with recent empirical evidence, we
￿nd two important results: the cost of debt decreases in the level of reserves if the probability
of liquidity shocks is high enough; however the cost of debt increases in reserves when the
lenders anticipate that the country has an incentive to default after a liquidity shock. Indeed,
in the event of such a shock, we show that the country may choose to retain reserves instead
of employing them to inject the liquidity needed to bring the production project to maturity.
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3.1 Introduction
Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2010) document that after the Great Depression and consequent
banking system crisis, a wave of sovereign debt defaults arose during the 1930s. To establish
this domino e⁄ect as a stylized fact in contemporary history a piece is missing: the failure of
major ￿nancial institutions in the recent crisis to trigger a series of sovereign debt crises in
the years ahead. This threat calls for a re￿ ection on the management of sovereign liquidity
and could become a test for the strategy, mainly employed by emerging economies after the
experience of the late ￿ 90s Asian crisis, of accumulating large amounts of sovereign reserves
as bu⁄er stock to face liquidity shocks.
In early 2000 this accumulation seemed to be justi￿ed by the self-insurance motive and
to be broadly in line with rules of thumb like the ￿Guidotti-Greenspan rule￿ ;1 however,
the recent increase in the resources devoted to reserves has made it urgent to understand
the costs associated with this build-up. Rodrik (2006) measures the opportunity cost of
accumulating large amounts of liquid assets (in particular US treasury bonds) as the spread
between external borrowing costs and reserves￿returns. Rodrik (2006) compares this ￿self-
insurance premium￿with the expected cost of a ￿nancial crisis in terms of reduced output
and concludes that in the last decade the amount of reserves accumulated by some countries
has grown too much. In order to assess the opportunity cost of holding reserves, we believe
that two further elements should be taken into account: the impact of reserves on future
domestic output and on the cost of debt.
We analyse the opportunity cost of holding reserves in a world where the sovereign
country is subject to liquidity crises and always has the option to default on debt. We
develop a model of optimal portfolio choice where country￿ s resources are determined by a
contracting game with international lenders, and characterize the equilibrium level of debt
price, sovereign reserves and expected output. Reserves are the country choice variable.
Instead, the debt price is set by the lenders and the country￿ s expected output results from
the share of total borrowed resources that is not devoted to reserves.
The strategic interaction between the agents is shaped by two crucial ￿nancial frictions:
lenders cannot inject the resources needed in the event of a liquidity shock and the country
cannot commit not to default on debt.2 These frictions introduce asset incompleteness into
our model, and this is necessary to disentangle the relationship between the country￿ s decision
to default and the cost of sovereign debt. Indeed, if assets are not contingent, risk-neutral
1To be consistent with this rule, reserves should be equivalent to the country￿ s short-term external debt.
2These assumptions are consistent with several papers in the literature and in particular with Holmstr￿m
and Tirole (1996, 1998), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Caballero and Panageas (2005) and Lorenzoni
(2007).
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competitive lenders incorporate the probability of default in the premium set on the debt
contract.
The optimal choice of reserves made by the country arises from the equilibrium between
two forces: on the one hand, reserves are liquid assets that can be injected in the event of
liquidity shocks and therefore help to avoid defaults (precautionary motive), on the other
hand, they distract resources from a more productive but illiquid project. The country also
takes into account the impact of reserves on the cost of debt; there are two con￿ icting e⁄ects
at work: the positive one is that, by allowing the country to avoid default in the event of
liquidity crises, reserves raise the probability for lenders to be repaid; the negative e⁄ect
is that reserves are not pledgeable in the event of default and distract resources from the
productive activity.
The novelty of our approach is that we do not assess whether the level of reserves is opti-
mal in terms of its opportunity cost per se. We take a more general perspective, considering
that when the country decides the optimal resource allocation it takes into account not only
the opportunity cost of holding reserves in terms of the expected return of an alternative
(illiquid) project, but also the e⁄ects of its choices on the price set by the lenders. In this
way, we can address a number of policy relevant questions regarding the impact of reserves
on the cost of sovereign debt and on the expected output.
We establish the following results. First of all, when there is a high probability of liquidity
crises, the cost of sovereign debt may decrease if the level of reserves is large enough; second,
the country can decide to default at equilibrium if it is hit by an adverse shock and ￿nds it
optimal to behave this way. We also analyse the e⁄ect of the chosen level of reserves and the
cost of debt on the sovereign expected output: we ￿nd that if the probability of a liquidity
crisis is high enough, then larger reserves, by insuring the country against a shock, have a
positive impact on expected output.
Our framework allows us to analyse how the sovereign investment choices are a⁄ected by
the ￿nancial and technological characteristics of the economy, namely the degree of riskiness
of the production project and the level of the country￿ s capital account openness. More
speci￿cally, we show that the opportunity cost of holding reserves increases with the variance
of the productive process due to a limited liability e⁄ect: when deciding how to invest its
resources the country disregards the lower tail of output realization (since in those cases
it would default), therefore the return on the productive project is increasing in the risk
associated with it. Finally, we show that, as the degree of sovereign capital account open-
ness increases, larger capital out￿ows in the event of sudden stops increases the country￿ s
incentives to default in such events.
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We contribute to the literature that studies the optimal decision of sovereign countries
to accumulate international reserves in the presence of strategic default on sovereign debt,
like Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) employ a setup in which the
sovereign keeps reserves while losing part of the output in the event of strategic default on
debt. In their model, the main upside of reserve accumulation is the possibility of employing
them to smooth consumption. They introduce the possibility of sovereign liquidity crises
in the form of contagion shocks (an abrupt variation in the interest rate) or sudden stops;
however, in their setup reserves do not have a particular role in avoiding such crises, instead
they are imperfect substitutes of external debt reduction for smoothing consumption. The
main result they obtain is that the optimal policy of the country features nil international
reserves and the intuition is that the country prefers to smooth consumption by lowering
debt exposure instead of accumulating reserves. In our model, we study the e⁄ect of the
country￿ s willingness-to-repay concerns on the cost of debt by modelling the funding game
between lenders and sovereign and obtain the rather di⁄erent result that the optimal level of
accumulated reserves can be positive at equilibrium. Remarkably, this is independent from
the working of the precautionary motive. In our setting the sovereign solves the investment
game by comparing the opportunity cost of reserves with respect to the productive activity:
provided the former is low enough, then hoarding reserves is rational. On top of this, we
perform an analysis of the role that reserves have in providing an insurance device against
liquidity shocks and study whether self-insurance is preferable to a strategy that does not
feature the injection of the necessary liquidity following a shock.
The level of resources available to the country for the investment game is not exogenous,
because we endogenously determine the cost of sovereign debt. Instead, we take the level
of outstanding liabilities as given and abstract from considerations about the possibility of
reducing short-term debt in order to create liquidity and thus lower the impact of a shock.
This assumption is consistent with the evidence in Rodrik (2006), which documents that,
in recent years, emerging economies have not reduced their exposure to short-term debt,
while accumulating large amounts of foreign liquid assets. Finally, we deliver our result by
abstracting from the role that reserves have in stabilizing exchange rates and promoting
exports (which instead is the main focus of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003).
We also contribute to the literature that studies optimal contractual arrangements in the
presence of commitment problems and non-contingent contracts, as in Arellano (2008). In
analogy to Arellano (2008), we show that default arises at equilibrium after an adverse shock
occurs, consistently with the received empirical evidence. However, while Arellano (2008)
studies the relationship between default risk and output, consumption and foreign debt, we
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look at the interaction between default risk and reserves, cost of debt and output.
We map the relationship between the cost of sovereign debt and the level of sovereign
reserves: the amount of reserves hoarded by a country may reduce the cost of debt. In
particular, this happens if the precautionary motive dominates. However, the opposite can
occur: if the rationale behind the accumulation of liquid assets is opportunistic (that is, if
the country prefers to keep reserves instead of employing them in the event of a liquidity
shock), then an increase in their amount raises the cost of debt. This result, namely that the
relationship between reserves and the cost of sovereign debt is not monotonic, is supported by
two pieces of empirical evidence. Levy Yeyati (2008) ￿nds in the data that holding reserves
reduces the spread on the debt issued over the risk-free return on assets to the extent that
reserves lower the probability of a run-induced default; moreover, the empirical analysis in
Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008) shows that the accumulation of reserves reduces the cost of
borrowing only up to a threshold and concludes that the level of reserves observed in Asian
countries is in line with an optimal insurance model.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the main features of the
model. In Section 3 we solve for the equilibrium of the game. First, we analyse a benchmark
framework without reserves, then we introduce the possibility for the country to (diversify its
portfolio and) choose between investing in liquid reserves and an illiquid production project.
In Section 4 we analyse the model￿ s equilibrium by undertaking numerical simulations, while
two possible extensions of the main setting are presented in Section 5: in the ￿rst we model
the optimal investment choice of a risk-averse country, in the second we introduce a supra-
national organization, e.g. the IMF, that can intervene to ￿nance the country in a liquidity
crisis. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider a sovereign country that needs to borrow D from international lenders. At stage
0a, the lenders set the rate of return on the resources lent to the country and at stage 0b, the
country decides on the allocation of the same resources.3 At stage 1, a liquidity shock may
take place: if a shock occurs the country has to decide whether to default at stage 2; in the
absence of the shock the game proceeds to stage 3. At stage 3 the productivity shock takes
place and at stage 4 the sovereign can again choose whether to default on debt. Figures
3.1 and 3.2 illustrate, respectively, the timing of the game and the game-tree. We solve
3For ease of exposition, we present the borrowing decision and the investment decision in sequence.
However, if the two games were solved simultaneously we would obtain the same results.
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the model by backward induction and the equilibrium concept we employ is the Sub-game
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
[FIGURES 3.1 AND 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
In this Section, we present in detail how we model each relevant node and the main
ingredients of the game.
3.2.1 The Lending Game
Our economy is populated by a continuum of atomistic and risk-neutral lenders (indexed
by i 2 I), from which the country can borrow. Each of these lenders is able to lend D, so that
the sovereign must borrow from a subset of mass 1 of them. The total mass of lenders is large,
ensuring that perfect competition prevails and lenders do not extract any rent; moreover,
the lenders are risk-neutral and have unlimited access to fund at the risk-less interest (that
we assume to be nil).
The lending game can be viewed as a general (common agency) contracting game between
a principal (the sovereign) and multiple agents (the lenders):4 as in Bolton and Jeanne
(2007), investors participate in a bidding game following the sovereign￿ s announcement of
a fund raising goal of D. Lenders move ￿rst by each making a bid simultaneously. The
sovereign then decides which bids to accept.
The lenders￿utility is equal to the value of the repayment D discounted by the probability
that the sovereign repays in full. At the bidding stage of the game, then, each lender i makes
an o⁄er on the rate of return, r(i), that is required to break even in expectation. A lender i
solves a problem of the following sort:
D = D(1 + r(i))ProbfThe Country is Solventg ()
1=(1 + r(i)) = ProbfThe Country is Solventg ()
￿(i) ￿ ProbfThe Country is Solventg:
Consequently, in the model the contract speci￿es the discount factor ￿(i) = 1=(1 + r(i))
that a lender i asks in exchange for a loan D. A Nash equilibrium of the lending game is
de￿ned by a set of bids (￿(i))i2I such that, for all i, bid ￿(i) maximizes lender i￿ s utility
taking all the other bids ￿(j), with j 6= i, as given. Clearly, at equilibrium the sovereign
squeezes all the surplus from the lending relationship and (randomly) selects among a set of
identical bids, ￿(j) = ￿(i) = ￿, so we can focus on a representative sovereign-lender pair.
4See, for example, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a,b), Hart and Tirole (1990).
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3.2.2 The Investment Game
The country is risk-neutral and can invest its funds in public expenditure, g, and/or
reserves, R. Therefore, the sovereign feasibility constraint is given by
￿D = g + R () g = ￿D ￿ R: (3.1)
When deciding resource allocation, the country maximizes its expected utility, denoted
by E(U(:)): this is determined by the amount of liquid resources gathered and by the
expected value of output. In the model, reserves (R) yield the risk-less interest rate and are
a storage and liquid technology that can be carried over from the stage in which they are
accumulated to the ￿nal stage of the game.
The production activity is the illiquid technology: it requires public expenditure (g)
as sole input and is subject to a productivity shock, z. The assumption we make is that
the output materializes at stage 4, after the country has decided on the allocation of its
resources and uncertainty over the shocks occurs. More speci￿cally, the output is generated
by a production function, Y (z;g), that is linearly a⁄ected by the productivity shock and
that, using (1), can be rewritten as:
Y (z;g) = zY (g) = zY (￿;R):
The shock z is such that z s F(z), where F(z), the cumulative distribution function, is
twice di⁄erentiable and continuous and f(z), the probability distribution function, is given by
dF(z)=dz = f(z). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that z follows a continuous uniform
distribution over [1 ￿ c;1 + c]; however, our results hold under alternative assumptions on
the distribution of z.5
Finally, the function Y (￿;R) is twice di⁄erentiable,6 with Y 0(:) ￿ 0, Y 00(:) < 0, it is
increasing in ￿, decreasing in R and satis￿es standard Inada Conditions (limg!0 Y (:) = 0,
limg!0 Y 0(:) = 1 and limg!+1 Y 0(:) = 0).
3.2.3 The Liquidity Shock
We assume that the country incurs in the risk of a liquidity shock at an intermediate
stage, before the outcome of the production activity.
Following Chang and Velasco (2000) we assume that, with probability ￿ 2 (0;1); the
illiquid project needs a further infusion of capital ￿ at stage two in order to be completed.
5In particular, Appendix D shows that the results of the model carry over under continuous distributions
with exponential density functions, like the normal and log-normal distributions.
6We choose this compact notation instead of Y (￿D ￿ R) to stress that the endogenous variables that
a⁄ect Y (:;:) are ￿ and R.
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If a liquidity shock occurs the country can only use the accumulated reserves to inject ￿,
while it cannot dismantle the capital invested in the production process. If it decides not to
tackle the shock with the infusion of capital, the country defaults on the process and retains
reserves.
3.2.4 The Default Decisions
There are two stages in the model at which the country may choose to default. The
￿rst is after the realization of the liquidity shock at stage two. The second is after the
realization of the productivity shock at the ￿nal stage (when output is realized). In this way,
we introduce the two main frictions of the model: the ￿rst is that the lender commits not
to inject the resources needed by the country if a liquidity shock occurs. The second is that
the country cannot undertake not to default when the realized output is lower than the face
value of debt.7
In analogy to what is typically assumed in the literature (e.g. Bolton and Jeanne, 2007),
the cost of default for the country consists of losing the entire output.8 However, in the
event of default the country keeps the reserves that it has accumulated, while the lender gets
nothing.9
For simplicity, we distinguish between two plans (that we denote F and N) depending
on the country￿ s choice at stage two to inject the needed liquidity should the shock occur.
We ￿nd it a useful the distinction as it allows as to easily characterize all possible branches
of the game-tree. Indeed, because of the ￿nancial friction of no commitment on the country
side, at each stage the sovereign can decide to default if it is convenient to do so, i.e. if the
expected utility from defaulting is greater that the one from continuation.10
[FIGURES 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3.3 illustrates the branches of the game-tree corresponding to the two plans.
Under plan N the country chooses to default if hit by the liquidity shock. Instead, under
plan F the country chooses to face the shock, but for this decision to be credible it must also
be feasible and time-consistent. Indeed, if at the investment game the country accumulates
a level of reserves lower than ￿ then it cannot inject the needed capital to face the shock
7Or, equivalently, that the lender cannot act as residual claimant if realized output is lower than the face
value of debt.
8See Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) for a discussion on output losses in the event of default.
9This assumption is consistent with Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009).
10Notice, however, that the crucial decision at time zero is how to allocate resources between R and g,
and the ￿nal equilibrium is always at most one.
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(resource constraint). Moreover, a problem of limited commitment may arise: if the country￿ s
payo⁄ from the continuation of the game following the shock is less than ￿ then the country
will prefer to default after the shock and retain reserves (no-default constraint).
Finally, the country may default after the realization of the productivity shock, in which
case the lender is not repaid.
3.2.5 A Discussion of Our Assumptions
To keep our model tractable and study the interaction between the e⁄ects that crucially
determine the country￿ s choices, we make a number of important assumptions.
First of all, we treat the level of the face value of debt D as an exogenous variable.
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) show that debt and reserves can both be employed to smooth
a country￿ s utility, and therefore their levels are connected. However, Rodrik (2006) ￿nds
that emerging economies seem to be more active in deciding how to allocate resources and,
in particular, in increasing the level of accumulated reserves; instead, the level of short-term
debt has not changed much in time. In this sense, ours can be considered a short-term
perspective theory, in which creditors set the debt price, either in the principal or secondary
market, by looking at the economic fundamentals of each country and taking the amount
of outstanding debt as given. Moreover, the fact that in the model the lender decides the
debt discount factor (￿) implies that she in￿ uences the total amount of resources available
for sovereign investment, and in this sense we develop a model with endogenous country
resources.
In the setting presented above there are two shocks; at time two a liquidity shock may hit
the country and at time three the productivity process z is realized. We assume that these
two shocks are orthogonal to each other and to the main variables of the model (especially
reserves). An alternative approach would be to assume that, if a liquidity shock occurs,
output would be adversely a⁄ected, by the shock itself, but also by a common underlying
process that guides the two uncertainties. Moreover, the liquidity and productive shock
processes may be linked to the variables set at time zero: for example, empirical studies
show that countries with higher reserves performed better during the recent ￿nancial crisis,
both in terms of output and of lower exchange rate depreciation and capital ￿ ight. The
analysis of the correlation among the shocks could lead to new dynamics and add interesting
results to the model; however, we leave it for future research.
The interest rate on the safe assets bought to build up reserves is set to zero. Also,
in the event of default the country loses the entire output. These two assumptions may
look somewhat extreme; however, (i) they are not uncommon in the literature and (ii)
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we do believe that they can be introduced without loss of generality, as a more realistic
parameterization would not change the nature of the results we obtain.
3.3 Solution of the Model
The analysis is conducted under the following simplifying technical restriction:
A1 : j￿Y 0;Rj > j￿￿ z;Rj:
Assumption (A1) is needed to make sure that the solution to the country￿ s maximization
problem is unique and implies that the output is more sensitive to changes in reserves than
the expected productivity level in the case of no default. More speci￿cally, ￿Y 0;R represents
the elasticity of the derivative of the production function to changes in the reserve level,
while ￿￿ z;R is the elasticity to changes in reserves of the default threshold ￿ z, which will be
de￿ned in what follows.11
In order to better disentangle the impact of reserves in this setting, in Section 3.1 we
solve the model assuming that reserves cannot be accumulated: clearly, in this benchmark
the country can never cover the liquidity shock. In Section 3.2, we allow the country to
decide how to allocate ￿D between g and R both in plan F and N.
Our objective is to compare the equilibrium levels of ￿, R and the expected output in the
two plans with the values resulting from the benchmark without reserves. Then, we assess
which plan maximizes the country￿ s expected utility and is implemented at equilibrium by
performing numerical simulations.
3.3.1 Benchmark without Reserves
If the country is hit by the shock in t = 1, then it is not able to repay ￿ and is already
in default at t = 1. Conversely, if the country is not hit by the shock, then it defaults at the
￿nal stage if:




￿ z represents the threshold level of the productive process: if the realized productivity is
higher, then the country repays its creditors and keeps the residual, otherwise the country
defaults on debt and loses the entire output. This introduces a problem of limited liability
on the country side, which in￿ uences the outcome of the investment game.
11In Section 4, we perform a set of numerical simulations of the model and show that (A1) is naturally
satis￿ed by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function.
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At the investment stage, resources are entirely invested in g. At t = 0, the lender sets
the optimal ￿ as to break-even in expectation:
￿D = D(1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ z(￿)
dF(z) () ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ F(￿ z(￿))] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)G(￿): (3.2)
In the absence of reserves, the lender takes into account that the break-even is attained
only if the liquidity shock does not take place, that is with probability (1 ￿ ￿). For conve-
nience, when we solve for the lender￿ s problem we denote by G(:) the survival function and
interpret it as the probability that the country is fully solvent after the productivity shock.
9! ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) s.t. ￿
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)G(￿
￿):
Proof. See Appendix A.
[FIGURE 3.4(a) ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3.4(a) illustrates the result of Lemma 3.3.1. The deal signed at the initial stage
between the lender and the sovereign can be implemented by a debt contract in which the
lender earns (D ￿￿
￿D) (or, equivalently, Dr￿=(1+r￿), with r=(1+r) = 1￿￿) provided the
country repays in full, zero otherwise.
3.3.2 Framework with Reserves
In what follows, we allow the country to accumulate reserves at the investment game
stage.
If the liquidity shock does not occur at t = 1, then the model proceeds as in the framework
without reserves and at t = 4 the country defaults after the realization of the productivity
shock if the following condition holds:




Conversely, if the liquidity shock occurs at t = 1, we distinguish between two cases,
depending on whether the country decides to face the liquidity shock (plan F) or not (plan
N).
Plan F
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At t = 4 the country defaults after the realization of the productivity shock if the
following condition holds:




At t = 2, the country would inject the new capital and go on with the project. Clearly, a
necessary condition for the country to do so is that it accumulates enough liquidity. In other
words, the outcome of the investment stage must be such that R ￿ ￿ (resource constraint).
Moreover, we analyse whether the decision to inject liquidity after the shock is sub-game
perfect. Given the choice on R by the country under plan F and the consequent contract
o⁄ered at t = 0 by the lender, it must be that the sovereign has incentive to continue with
the liquid project instead of defaulting strategically at t = 2, otherwise the same plan would
not be time-consistent. The no-default constraint that has to hold follows:
R ￿ ￿ +
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ R ()
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿:




dF(z) () ￿ = 1 ￿ F(￿ z(￿;R)) ￿ G(￿;R):
In this case, the formulation of the investor￿ s problem takes into account that the sov-
ereign does not default after a liquidity shock.




E(UF(￿;R)) = R +
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿￿; (3.3)
The country is certain to R, because reserves are not lost in the event of default. The
second term in (3.3) is the expected value of the production project net of D: this second term
is positive by construction, because the expected value of output is truncated downwards by
￿ z. The third term in expression (3.3) is the expected value of the liquidity shock.
The maximization problem in (3.3) is solved under the aforementioned constraints:
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿; (3.4)
R ￿ ￿; (3.5)
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which make sure that the implementation of plan F is sub-game perfect.
Plan N
At t = 2, if the sovereign chooses to default after the liquidity shock, it loses output but
keeps the accumulated liquidity (R).
At t = 0a, the lender replies by setting ￿ as to break-even in expectation:
￿D = D(1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
dF(z) () ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ F(￿ z(￿;R))] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)G(￿;R):
In this case, the lender anticipates that the country defaults on the liquidity shock in
t = 2.
At t = 0b, the country￿ s choice of R is derived by solving the following problem:
max
R2[0;￿D]
E(UN(￿;R)) = R + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z):
The decision to default on the liquidity shock implies two things: the ￿rst is that the
sovereign obtains the net expected payo⁄from the production project only if exempted from
the liquidity shock (with probability 1 ￿ ￿); the second is that the sovereign does not need
to inject ￿ to bring the illiquid project to the end. Finally, the country gets R in all states
of the world.
3.3.3 Equilibrium De￿nition
The equilibrium is de￿ned by the vector f￿;Rg such that the country￿ s behaviour is
optimal and the lender breaks even in expectation. Moreover, with liquidity shock coverage
(that is, when plan F is chosen), the country￿ s actions must be sub-game perfect, insofar as
both the no-default constraint and the resource constraint must be satis￿ed.
De￿nition 3.1
De￿ne F ￿ f￿
￿￿
F ;R￿￿
F g as the pair that characterizes the plan in which the country decides
to face the liquidity shock. At F ￿ f￿
￿￿
F ;R￿￿













F ) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿:
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De￿ne N ￿ f￿
￿￿
N;R￿￿
Ng as the pair that characterizes the plan in which the country
decides not to face the liquidity shock.
The SPNE of the game is given by plan F if E(U(￿
￿￿
F ;R￿￿




relevant constraints are satis￿ed, otherwise plan N is chosen by the country.






F g. Then, we analyse the coun-
try￿ s choice between plan N and plan F, and the features of the corresponding equilibrium.
We ￿nd that when the country accumulates reserves, the discount factor set by the
lender is higher than in the benchmark without reserves if the country has an incentive to
inject liquidity after the liquidity shock (that is, under plan F) and the probability of the
liquidity shock (￿) is big enough. At the same time, a high enough value of ￿ implies that the
country￿ s expected output is greater under plan F than under plan N and in the no-reserves
case. Finally, we show that the lower the incidence of the liquidity shock (￿), the more likely
it is that the country will ahve an incentive to face the shock (and that plan F will arise at
equilibrium).
3.3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
First of all, we analyse country￿ s decision to accumulate reserves and the consequent
choice of the discount factor ￿ taken by the lender under plan N.
Assume (A1) holds. If
lim
R!0


























Proof. See Appendix B.
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Lemma 3.3.4 shows that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies under plan
N, provided condition (3.6) is satis￿ed. We now turn to the determination of the value of
reserves and discount factor under plan F, that is when the country chooses to inject the
needed liquidity after the shock ￿ occurs at stage t = 1.











































































Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 3.3.4 shows that, under the relevant conditions outlined above, there exists a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies under plan F if and only if either the resource constraint
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or the no-default constraint binds. Instead, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
if both the resource and the no-default constraints are binding.12
When deciding the optimal value of R, the country trades-o⁄ the marginal return of









@R dF(z) under plan N. Over-
all, then, the sovereign accumulates a positive level of reserves provided the marginal return
of the illiquid project is low enough. However, the fact that under plan N the country
reaches the ￿nal stage only if it is exempted from the liquidity shock (with probability 1￿￿)
implies that, ceteris paribus, the level of accumulated liquidity is higher there.
The country defaults when the value of the productivity shock z falls below ￿ z, that is,
it is limitedly liable in the obligation to repay the lender. This a⁄ects the sovereign decisions
at the investment game, because, as will be further explored in the section on comparative
statics, the expected return of the output is boosted by a higher volatility of the shock z, at
the expense of the investment in the liquid asset (R).
3.3.4.1 The Impact of Reserves on the Discount Factor set by the Lender
The sovereign choice to inject liquidity after the shock occurs at t = 1 a⁄ects the discount
factor set by the lender. If the country decides to default at t = 2 (as it does under plan
N) then the problem solved by the lender is analogous to the one in Lemma 1, with the
di⁄erence that the value of reserves was nil there. The following lemma compares the value
of the discount factor in the benchmark with the one that the country obtains when choosing
plan N.
The optimal value of ￿ set by the lender in response to plan N, ￿
￿￿
N, is lower than the
one set in the benchmark without reserves, ￿
￿.
Without the reserves￿insurance role, from the point of view of the lender the accu-
mulation of liquid assets diverts resources from the production activity and increases the
12The intuition for this outcome is given in the following. If the resource constraint is binding, then the
country would like to accumulate a lower level of reserves than the necessary injection, but the constraint
satisfaction ￿xes R exactly at ￿. In other words, the resource constraint sets a higher R than in an uncon-
strained optimum. The role of the no-default constraint is the opposite. Since the expected residual output
after repaying the creditors (in the event of no default, that is the left-hand-side of the no-default constraint)
is decreasing in R, a binding no-default constraint implies that although the country would like to accumulate
a higher level of reserves, it has to reduce R in order to satisfy the no-default constraint with an equality.
In other words, the impact of the level of reserves in the two constraints goes in two opposite directions:
R should increase with respect to the unconstrained optimum in order to satisfy the resource constraint; R
should decrease with respect to the unconstrained optimum to satisfy the no-default constraint. Overall,
this implies that an equilibrium in which both constraints are contemporaneously binding cannot exist.
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likelihood of sovereign default after the realization of the productivity shock. Consequently,
the amount of resources available to the country to sustain sovereign investment production
in plan N shrinks.13
If the country chooses to face the shock at t = 1 (plan F), then the impact on the
problem solved by the lender is ambiguous, and eventually depends on ￿. With respect
to the framework without reserves, on the one hand the accumulation of liquid assets re-
duces expected output, on the other hand it allows the country to face the liquidity shock
successfully.
Below, we compare the discount factor set by the lender in plan F with the discount
factor in the benchmark case without reserves.












F )) ￿ F(￿ z(￿
￿))
[1 ￿ F(￿ z(￿
￿))]
2 (0;1):
Proof. The proof follows by comparing G(￿
￿;R￿￿
F )) with G(￿
￿).
Therefore, if the probability of a shock occurring is greater than ￿￿￿, the discount factor
of debt with reserves is higher than in the case without reserves. Remember that, in the
model, there is an inverse relationship between the discount factor ￿ and the rate of return
r, since ￿ = 1=(1 + r); consequently, if ￿ increases the rate of return decreases.
[FIGURES 3.4(b) and 3.4(c) ABOUT HERE]
Lemma 3.3.4.1 is illustrated in Figure 3.4(b) and 3.4(c). More speci￿cally, we show that
when the probability attached to the occurrence of the liquidity shock (￿) is high enough,
then the discount factor is higher when the country accumulates reserves in excess of ￿ and
injects liquidity (plan F) than in the benchmark case without reserves (Figure 3.4c). The
lender takes into account that reserves help the country to be solvent when the liquidity shock
occurs and ￿prices￿D accordingly. In the complementary case, the lender anticipates that
the accumulated reserves are ￿too high￿relative to the real danger of the shock occurring
13Remember that there is an inverse relationship between the discount factor and the rate of return asked
by the lender: a higher discount factor is equivalent to a lower rate of return.
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(￿ < ￿￿￿) and sets a lower discount factor (￿) under plan F with respect to the benchmark
without reserves (see Figure 3.4b).
Proposition 3.3.4.1 summarizes the resulting impact of reserves on the lender￿ s decisions
under plan F and plan N with respect to the case without reserves.




￿ If the country faces the liquidity shock, then the impact of the accumulation of reserves
on the value of the discount factor ￿ depends on the probability of the liquidity shock,
￿:








Proof. See the discussion above.
In the following section, we study the impact of the accumulation of reserves on the
country￿ s expected output.
3.3.4.2 The Impact of Reserves on the Country￿ s Expected Output
The decisions to accumulate reserves and face the liquidity shock a⁄ect the country￿ s
expected output in a way that is even clearer than in the case of the discount factor.
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First of all, we compare the outcomes of plan N with the benchmark, in terms of expected
output.
The expected value of output in plan N is lower than in the benchmark without reserves.
The result in Lemma 3.3.4.2 is a consequence of the result in Lemma 3.3.4.1, in which it
is shown that when the country does not inject the capital needed to o⁄set the liquidity shock




ND. Moreover, in plan N the country invests in reserves, further reducing the
resources allotted to the illiquid project.
In plan F the country is fully insured against the liquidity shock; instead, in the bench-
mark the country is certain to default if it is hit by the same shock. This consideration leads
us to the following result.
If ￿ > ^ ￿, the expected value of output in plan F is larger than in the benchmark without
reserves.
Summarizing the results in Lemmata 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.2, as ￿ grows to 1 the expected
value of production in the case where the country injects liquidity after the shock (plan F)
dominates the other two cases. This leads directly to Proposition 3.3.4.2 below.















￿ If the country faces the liquidity shock, then the impact of the accumulation of reserves
on the value of the expected output depends on the probability of the liquidity shock,
￿:
￿If ￿ < ^ ￿ then (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1









￿If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ then (1 ￿ ￿)
R 1
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Proof. See the discussion above.






F g that solve the
country￿ s maximization problem and the lender￿ s zero-pro￿t condition under plan N and
plan F, respectively. In Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we analyse how the discount factor
and the expected output are a⁄ected by the probability of a liquidity shock.
In the next section, we continue studying the country￿ s choice at equilibrium by under-
taking some comparative statics on the exogenous variables of the model.
3.3.4.3 Comparative Statics
The goal of the this section is to analyse the impact of other characteristics of the economy
that have so far been kept ￿xed. We investigate the e⁄ects on the resource allocation ￿in
reserves or public expenditure ￿of an increase in the variability of the investment project,
and therefore its risk, and of an increase in the dimension of capital out￿ ows in the event of
a liquidity crisis, ￿.
The level of reserves is optimally chosen by looking at the opportunity cost of holding
them in terms of the alternative investment. The expected return of the investment in output














In both cases, the opportunity cost has to equal the return on reserves (recall that, for
simplicity, we ￿xed the interest rate on the liquid and safe asset at zero, and therefore the
return on reserves is equal to 1).
To assess the impact of the distribution of the shock, and in particular of its variance,
on the opportunity cost of holding reserves, we begin by using the assumption that z is
distributed as a continuous uniform with support [1 ￿ c;1 + c]; this implies that:
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
zdF(z) = [(1 + c)










(￿ z(￿;R))2 ￿ (1 + c)(1 ￿ c)
16c2 :
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Therefore, in the case of a continuous uniform distribution, as c increases above unity the
incentive that a country has to invest an additional unit of resources in reserves decreases
in both plan F and plan N.14 An increase of c also triggers an increase in the variance
of the uniform distribution, which is equal to c2=3. Consequently, we can conclude that in
the case of the uniform distribution, an increase in the variance can boost the incentive to
de-cumulate reserves. This result is even more robust in the case of exponential probability
density functions, for which a jump in the variance of the distribution increases the value of
R 1
￿ z(￿;R) zdF(z) and makes hoarding reserves relatively less pro￿table.15
An increase in the variance of the productivity shock z increases the opportunity cost of re-
serves.
In both the distributions considered above, an increase in the variance does not change
the expected value of the productivity shock; however, it increases the expected value of z
given the possibility of the country defaulting. In other words, Corollary 1 is linked to a
limited liability e⁄ect: the country enjoys the upper tail of the distribution of the realizations
of the productivity shock while it disregards the lower tail. Therefore, an increase in the
riskiness of the illiquid project raises the opportunity cost of holding reserves and in￿ ates
sovereign incentive to invest in g instead of R.16 We further investigate the impact of the
limited liability e⁄ect in the section where the optimal portfolio allocation of a risk-averse
country is studied in the extension presented below.
We now turn our attention to ￿, the amount of liquid resources the country needs to
inject in the event of a liquidity shock at t = 1. This parameter could be interpreted as
a proxy for the capital account openness of the country and it therefore represents capital
￿ ight in a sudden stop. In line with Obstfeld et al. (2009), ￿ could more generally represent
the fraction of the M2 aggregate (a proxy for the size of the banking system) the country
needs to inject should a double drain occur.
In our model, ￿ does not a⁄ect the opportunity cost directly; however, it adversely a⁄ects
country￿ s expected utility of plan F. Moreover, ￿ has an impact on the no-default constraint
14Notice that @Y (￿;R)=@R is independent from the shape of the distribution of z.
15To see this, note that, in the case of exponential probability density functions, were the variance to rise,
the value of
R 1
￿1 zdF(z) would stay the same. Instead, as long as ￿ z(￿;R) < 1, an increase in the variance
implies that the truncated expected value of z weighted by its density f(z) rises.
16Another implication of this is that if the country could choose among di⁄erent projects, it would prefer
a riskier one (other things being equal).
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the country has to satisfy in order to credibly adhere to plan F:
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
[zY (￿;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿:
Intuitively, as the liquidity needs increase, the constraint becomes more binding, and
therefore it is more likely that the equilibrium choice of reserves under plan F is constrained.
All these reasons lead us to the conclusion in the following corollary.
An increase in the needed liquidity injection (￿) makes the emergence of plan F less likely at
equilibrium.
In the next Section, to gain further insights on the value of the model￿ s key variables
(reserves, debt discount factor and public expenditures) at equilibrium, and see under which
conditions a country decides to default should the liquidity shock occur, we undertake a
numerical analysis.
3.4 Simulations
Here we present a numerical example that illustrates the results above.17 More speci￿-
cally, it is assumed that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas of the following type:
Y (z;g) = zY (g) = zY (￿;R) = z(￿D ￿ R)
￿:
Also, we maintain the assumption for which the productivity shock is distributed as a
uniform random variable:
z ￿ U(1;c
2=3);z 2 [1 ￿ c;1 + c]:
There are ￿ve parameters to be set:
￿ income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 40%
￿ capital infusion as % of GDP 10%
c support of the productivity process 2
￿ probability of the liquidity shock 15%
17For the sake of the exposition, we focus on cases in which an equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is
well-de￿ned.
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The income share of capital is taken from the literature. The face value of debt D is
chosen in order to obtain on average an amount of gross debt over GDP of around 40%, in
line with the data for 2009 reported by the IMF in World Economic Outlook for emerging
and developing countries. The needed capital infusion in the event of a liquidity shock is ￿xed
at 10% of the expected GDP, as proposed in Rodrik (2006) and Obstfeld et al. (2009). The
variance of the productivity process and the probability of the liquidity shock are arbitrary.
We then make them vary to check how those parameters a⁄ect the choice variables, ￿ and
R, and to check the robustness of our results. With the proposed parameters we obtain
estimates of the value of reserves over expected output of around 15%, slightly below the
20% estimated by Jeanne (2007). Moreover, in our simulations the discount factor generates
a rate of return r that oscillates around 1: this is the same rate of return that would be
generated by a 10-year bond capitalized at an annual interest rate of about 7%, which is a
value of the annual rate in line with the empirical evidence in Borri and Verdelhan (2009).18
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 5 reports the main results of the simulation when the probability of the liquidity
shock moves from zero to 50%. It shows how the cost of debt, the expected output, the
reserve level and the country￿ s expected welfare vary when the probability of the liquidity
shock increases.
The upper-left panel shows that the cost of debt increases with the increase in the risk
of the liquidity shock in two cases, namely in the framework without reserves and when the
country chooses not to face the liquidity shock when it occurs (plan N).19 Instead, if the
country decides to face the liquidity shock (plan F) the cost of debt is constant for any value
of ￿, because the country is perfectly insured independently of the probability of the adverse
event occurring.
The upper-left panel of Figure 5 graphically presents the result of Proposition 1. More
speci￿cally, it shows the threshold ￿￿￿ (which here corresponds to a probability of the liquidity
shock around 4%): if the probability of the liquidity shock is higher than ￿￿￿, then the
discount factor in the framework without reserves (￿
￿) rises above the discount factor with
18Recall that the discount factor ￿ is equal to 1=(1+r): In our model, ￿ is inversely correlated to the cost
of debt: an increase in the value of ￿ set by the lender re￿ ects an increase in the probability that the lender
expects the country to be solvent and stands for a decrease in the cost of debt.
19Notice that in the framework in which the country can accumulate a positive amount of reserves, the
case ￿no reserves￿cannot be a credible choice since, in the absence of commitment, the country will always
prefer a positive amount of reserves at any discount factor o⁄ered by the lender as represented by plan F
and plan N. We simulate the equilibrium variables in the framework with no reserves in order to have means
of comparison.
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reserves when the lender anticipates that the country will face the liquidity shock (￿
￿￿
F ). From
this simulation, we also infer that when the country decides not to face the liquidity shock
the cost of debt is always higher (￿ lower) because this choice makes the lender worse o⁄.
The upper-right panel of Figure 5 displays the path of sovereign expected output. It
presents the results of Proposition 2. The expected output of the benchmark case without
reserves is always higher than the expected output in plan N. Moreover, the expected output
in the benchmark is above the one of plan F if ￿ is below a certain threshold ^ ￿ de￿ned in
Lemma 7 (which here corresponds to a probability of the liquidity shock of around 30%).
The amount of accumulated reserves, reported in the lower-left panel, decreases when ￿
increases with no capital infusion, because the resources available to the country (equal to
￿
￿￿
ND) decrease with ￿. If, instead, the country decides to face the liquidity shock, should
it occur, the level of reserves does not depend on the probability of the shock and the two
constraints (resource constraint and no-default constraint) are slack at any level of ￿:
Finally, the lower-right panel plots the country￿ s welfare in the two plans which the
country can choose between: when the country accumulates reserves and faces the liquidity
shock (plan F), the welfare is always higher than if it decides not to inject capital (plan
N). Moreover, the resource constraint (lower-left panel) and the no-default constraint (not
reported in the ￿gure) are always satis￿ed under plan F, so the country chooses to face the
liquidity shock if it occurs.
From this ￿rst simulation of the model we can conclude that, under the chosen parame-
ters, the country accumulates reserves and injects capital if the liquidity shock occurs at any
value of ￿. The lender anticipates this choice when setting the discount factor of debt and
sets ￿
￿￿
F to satisfy its zero-pro￿t condition.
[FIGURE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]
The simulations in Figure 3.6 show how the variables of interest and the ￿nal equilibrium
of the model vary when the variance of the underlying productivity process (equal to c2=3)
moves from 1 to 52
5. As reported in Corollary 1, when the variability of the productivity shock
increases, the opportunity cost of holding reserves increases, because of a limited liability
e⁄ect. Consequently, the country chooses a lower level of reserves and the discount factor on
debt decided by the lender in response is lower, because more resources are invested in the
productive activity.
Therefore, as the variance rises, the trade-o⁄ between accumulating enough reserves to
face the shock and putting more resources in the productive project leads to a smaller pile
of liquid and safe assets. There is a threshold of the variance for which the country decides
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to gather R = ￿ and at which the resource constraint becomes binding under plan F.20
Moreover, as the variance increases, the level of reserves chosen under plan N decreases to
zero.
The overall impact on expected output and welfare is that they both increase as the
sovereign decides to de-cumulate reserves. This is due to the role of residual claimant of the
country if it decides not to default. Finally, when the country decides to face the liquidity
shock (plan F), the expected output is higher than when the country chooses not to inject
the necessary liquidity (plan N), but for the case of a very high level of variability of the
shock. This is due to the fact that under plan F the level of R cannot get smaller than the
needed liquidity infusion.
The equilibrium chosen is plan N for very low levels of the variance, due to the high cost
of facing the shock compared with the opportunity cost of investing in output (weighted by
the probability of the liquidity shock not occurring).
For higher levels of the variability, however, the country prefers to accumulate more
reserves and face the liquidity shock since the expected output increases. The welfare under
plan F increases more than under plan N because the underlying cost is ￿xed in the ￿rst
case (￿￿) while it increases with the variance in the second case (it is the expected output
weighted by the probability of the liquidity shock).
[FIGURE 3.7 ABOUT HERE]
The last simulation performed shows how the country￿ s choice of equilibrium plan is
a⁄ected by the importance of the liquidity shock (￿). In Figure 3.7, we let the value of ￿
vary to illustrate the result in Corollary 2. To obtain this ￿gure, we change the values of
parameters D and c as follows:
￿ income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 60%
c support of the productivity process
p
3
￿ probability of a liquidity shock 15%
We increase the value of D, the available liquidity, and decrease the value of c, the
variability of the productivity process. In this way, besides the results of Corollary 2, we
are able to show the in￿ uence of the no-default constraint, reported in the lower-left panel.
Under plan F, when the no-default constraint becomes binding, the country has to choose
20In this simulation, the no-default constraint is always veri￿ed for plan F and is not reported in the
￿gure.
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256363.5. EXTENSIONS 101
a level of reserves lower than the unconstrained optimum; this in turn induces the lender to
o⁄er a better discount for the debt (higher ￿). The two e⁄ects contribute to an increase in
the expected output and welfare. As ￿ further increases the level of reserves approaches the
resource constraint and therefore, as proved in Appendix C, an equilibrium no longer exists
under plan F. The only equilibrium of the game features the choice of plan N.
3.5 Extensions
In what follows we study two possible extensions of the present analysis. In the ￿rst, we
introduce risk-aversion in order to show that the optimal level of reserves can be signi￿cantly
higher if we change the shape of the country￿ s utility function. In the second extension, a
third player is introduced: we assume that a supranational organization can provide the
liquidity needed in the event of a liquidity crisis. In this way we relax the friction on the
￿nancial markets￿commitment not to intervene in the event of a liquidity shock.
3.5.1 Risk-averse utility function
In the main model, we assume that the country is risk-neutral, therefore it takes into
account only the expected value of alternative investments either in safe and liquid assets
(reserves) or in a risky project (output). In line with Arellano (2008), in the following
we assume that the country is risk-averse, that is, it also looks at the second moment of
alternative investment opportunities. We expect to ￿nd that, all else being equal, the country
prefers to invest more in the safe asset, so that the relative level of reserves chosen should be
higher than in the previous analysis with linear utility. Notice that nothing changes for the
lender, who is assumed to be risk-neutral and price the debt taking into account the same
trade-o⁄ induced by the reserves as in the main model: reserves divert resources from the
productive investment, but on the other hand they can be employed to face the liquidity
crisis, should it occur, and therefore avoid default at time two.
We make use of a standard CRRA utility function with a parameter of risk aversion equal
to 1. Following Section 3.2, we re-write the expected output and the related constraints for
the two plans (F and N) by making use of a logarithmic utility function.
Plan F
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At t = 0b, the country maximizes the following expression:
max
R
E(UF(￿;R)) = (1 ￿ ￿)
"Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)















subject to the no-default and resource constraints:
Z ￿ z(￿;R)
￿1
log(R ￿ ￿)dF(z) +
Z 1
￿ z(￿;R)
log[zY (￿;R) ￿ D + R ￿ ￿]dF(z) ￿ log(R);
R ￿ ￿:
The resource constraint does not change in the new setup, while the no-default constraint
incorporates the disutility generated by the uncertainty over the output realization.
Plan N












We conduct a numerical simulation to ￿nd the equilibrium pair (~ ￿; ~ R). In line with
the analysis conducted for the probability of liquidity shock (￿) that varies, we set the four
parameters as reported in the table below:
￿ income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 40%
￿ capital infusion as % of GDP 10%
c support of the productivity process 2
[FIGURE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]
The simulations are reported in Figure 3.8. In line with the previous analysis, plan F is
the one implemented at any value of ￿ between 0 and 50%. Notice that in this case, even
under plan F, the probability of a liquidity crisis a⁄ects all the equilibrium variables. In par-
ticular, it reduces the expected welfare, induces the country to invest more in reserves, which
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in turn makes the investor ￿x a lower debt discount factor (or a higher rate of return). Plan
N, with this parametrization, coincides with the case of no-reserves, since the country would
like to accumulate a negative amount of reserves, and therefore the constrained equilibrium
is at R = 0. As a consequence, in this case the country￿ s expected welfare collapses, because
of the shape of the utility function, and this plan is never implemented at equilibrium.
In the present simulations the threshold ￿￿￿ - de￿ned in Proposition 1 - is higher than
with linear utility and equal to about 10%. Intead, the threshold ^ ￿ - de￿ned in Proposition 2
- is not reported in the second panel. For ￿ between 0 and 50%, the output with no reserves
is always higher than under plan F. This happens for two reasons: the ￿rst is that a larger
fraction of the available resources is put in reserves instead of in the risky investment, the
second is that in the case of a risk-averse country the expected output decreases with ￿ under
plan F.
[FIGURE 3.9 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 3.9, we compare the amount of resources invested in reserves in terms of ex-
pected output in the two cases, namely with linear and logarithmic utility. With logarithmic
utility, the amount of resources saved in reserves is about 70% of the expected output. It is
a very high level, exceeding by far that of reserves in the case of linear utility.
With our analysis, we do not pretend to predict the optimal level of reserves; however, the
results that emerge from this extension allow us to conclude that, by making the hypothesis
of linear utility, researchers can obtain only a lower bound for the optimal level of reserves.
This lower bound needs to be corrected upwards in the case of perceived risk aversion by the
economic authorities.
3.5.2 IMF intervention
In this section, we introduce a supranational organization, e.g. the IMF, which can
intervene in the interim period and help the country by injecting ￿ should the liquidity shock
occur.21 We assume that the application for IMF intervention is decided by the country
before the contracting stage; therefore, at time zero the lender and the country already
know whether the IMF will intervene in a liquidity shock. Moreover, the intervention takes
place by means of an instrument that covers the entire amount of liquidity needed.
At t = 4, if not hit by the liquidity shock, the country defaults if z ￿ ￿ z(￿;R) ￿
D=Y (￿;R).
21This way, we propose a simpli￿ed setting for the analysis of Flexible Credit Lines (FCL), a new IMF
instrument available without ex-post conditionality for member countries that satisfy pre-determined criteria
(for details see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2009/032409.htm)
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Instead, if hit by the shock ￿, at t = 4 the country has to repay the IMF at the market
price (recall the risk-free interest rate is nil); however, as in the case of the international
lender, the IMF cannot act as a residual claimant and is not repaid in the event of default.
More speci￿cally, at the ￿nal stage the country decides to default strategically if the following
is true:
zY (￿;R) ￿ D + R ￿ ￿ ￿ R () z ￿ ^ z(￿;R) ￿
D + ￿
Y (￿;R)









[zY (￿;R) ￿ D ￿ ￿]dF(z) ￿ R:
The condition above is satis￿ed by construction, implying that the IMF intervention
clears the incentive to default on the liquidity shock at t = 2. At t = 0 the country
chooses how to allocate resources between public expenditure and reserves by maximizing


















￿ = ￿(1 ￿ F(^ z(￿;R))) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(￿ z(￿;R))):
The intervention of the IMF introduces a trade-o⁄into the model. On the one hand, the
problem of insurance against liquidity shock disappears. On the other hand, the probability
of the country￿ s default on debt at t = 4 is higher than in the case of no liquidity shock,
because the outstanding debt is higher in that case. Consequently, the associated threshold
below which the country defaults increases in the event of a liquidity shock (with probability
￿).
The trade-o⁄ above implies that the intervention of the IMF impacts on the lender￿ s
break-even problem solution in an interesting fashion, especially when compared to the
solution of the lender problem in the cases of plan F and plan N. More speci￿cally, since,
with respect to plan F (see equation 3.4), the country will default more often on its debt
under IMF intervention, the lender will set a lower discount factor ￿ when the IMF intervenes.
However, if we compare the optimal value of ￿ with the IMF against the one under plan
N , the contrary is true, so that, everything else being equal, the value of ￿ under IMF
intervention should be higher than in the no injection case (N).
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/256363.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 105
[FIGURE 3.10 ABOUT HERE]
The simulations are reported in Figure 3.10. By comparing the levels of expected welfare,
it is clear that IMF intervention is preferred to the other plans. Under the IMF scenario,
the rate of return (respectively, discount factor) set by the lender is always higher (lower)
than the one set under plan F due to the trade-o⁄ discussed above. However, the rate of
return under IMF intervention is lower than under plan N, since when the IMF intervenes
the lender expects the country not to default should a liquidity crisis occur. Reserves are
also slightly lower with the IMF than under plan F, although this di⁄erence is not very
large.
Overall, this extension predicts that the intervention by an international organization to
solve the liquidity crisis does not reduce signi￿cantly the will to accumulate reserves. In fact,
even though reserves are no longer needed to face the liquidity shock, they are still a form
of saving in which the country can invest and retain in the event of default. Consequently,
the optimal portfolio allocation still prescribes a positive amount of safe and liquid assets.
Finally, the combined e⁄ect of the accumulated level of reserves and the higher proba-
bility of default in a liquidity crisis implies that the lender ￿xes a cost of debt with the IMF
that is larger than under plan F. This shows that, per-se, when liquidity crises can occur
IMF intervention does not necessarily ease the pressure on the sovereign debt rate of return.
To accomplish this result, the ￿nancial instrument proposed by a supranational organization,
or simply bilateral agreements, should be designed to limit country￿ s incentive to default on
debt.
Summarizing, on the one hand the way the IMF instrument is designed in this analysis
decreases the probability of default, since it eliminates the need for the country to default in
case of liquidity crises, on the other hand it exacerbates the solvency problem by increasing
the probability of default at the last stage.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the discussion about the management of liquidity and the
optimal level of sovereign reserves for countries that are subject to liquidity crises. We
are able to model simultaneously endogenous debt prices, optimal reserve accumulation
and strategic default decisions. In our setup, the country optimally decides the level of
international reserves that maximizes its expected welfare taking into account the probability
of a liquidity crisis and the possibility of defaulting (with the cost in terms of output of this
action). Competitive international lenders anticipate the country choice and set a rate of
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return over the lent resources that satis￿es the zero-pro￿t condition. Therefore, we deliver a
model that abstracts from the role of reserves in managing the exchange rate and that instead
draws on the opportunity cost of holding reserves in terms of reduced expected output.
Our results rationalize the self-insurance motive for accumulating reserves and facing
liquidity shocks, as well as the limited liability e⁄ect due to the impossibility for the country
to commit not to default on its debt. The combination of these two forces drives our results:
we show that both an equilibrium featuring the country self-insuring against the shock and
one with the country not facing the shock can emerge depending on the productivity process,
the amount of resources available in the country and the probability and dimension of the
liquidity crisis. Finally, we are able to reproduce the empirical evidence of Levy Yeyati
(2008) and Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008): the level of international reserves reduces the
costs of external debt for sovereign countries that face a high probability of being hit by a
liquidity crisis.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1
The equilibrium value of ￿, denoted ￿
￿, exists and is unique if and only if G(￿) satis￿es
the following ￿ve conditions.
Condition (i): 9lim￿!0 G(:) < 1:
Taking limits, it can be shown that this condition holds:
￿ ! 0 ) ￿ z(￿) ! 1 ) F(￿ z(￿)) ! 1 ) G(￿) ! 0:
Condition (ii): lim￿!1 G(:) < 1:
Again, taking limits, one has that also condition (ii) holds:
￿ ! 1 ) ￿ z(￿) !
D
Y (1)
) F(￿ z(1)) ! k 2 (0;1) ) G(￿) ! 1 ￿ k < 1:
Condition (iii): dG(￿)=d￿ > 0:











(Y (￿))2 > 0:
Condition (iv): d2G(￿)=d￿
2 < 0:
Condition (iv) is necessary (but not su¢ cient) for uniqueness and imposes a restriction on














Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/25636B.. PROOF OF LEMMA 2 111
The second term of (A.14) is strictly negative, thus the sign of the inequality depends
on the sign of the ￿rst term: we then use the assumption of uniform distribution of z, which
implies that df(￿ z(￿))=d￿ = 0, to get that (A.14) holds true.
Condition (v): lim￿!0 dG(￿)=d￿ > 1.
This condition is necessary to make sure that an interior solution exists that is di⁄erent from
the trivial one, i.e. ￿ = 0, to the ￿xed point problem that we are analysing. Taking limits,








(Y (￿))2 = 1: (A.15)
This result uses the assumption of uniform distribution of z, for which f(￿ z(￿)) does not




(Y (￿))2 !￿!0 1:
￿
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The problem solved by the lender under plan N and the one we solved in Lemma 3.3.1
are isomorphic. Therefore, following the steps of the proof in Appendix A with the use of
the Envelope Theorem allows us to pin down the unique reaction function ~ ￿N = ￿N(R) that
solves the lender￿ s zero-pro￿t condition.23
Under plan N, the sovereign faces the following problem:
max
R2[0;~ ￿ND)
E(UN(~ ￿N;R)) = R + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
￿ z(~ ￿N;R)
[zY (~ ￿N;R) ￿ D]dF(z): (B.16)
22Here, we are implicitly restricting our attention to the cases where ￿ z(￿) 2 [1 ￿ c;1 + c], since otherwise
the lender would never serve the country and one would have that the solution to the problem is given by
￿ = 0.
23In particular, notice that when evaluating the limit of G(:;:) as ￿ approaches zero also R tends to zero,
because a nil discount factor implies that the country has no resources available at the investment stage.
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We now compute the ￿rst order condition of the expression above (and employ the
Envelope Theorem when disregarding the e⁄ect of a change of R on ~ ￿N). After setting the
resulting derivative with respect to R to zero, we have:





zdF(z) = 0: (B.17)
In order to determine the existence of a solution to our problem we need to show two
preliminary results. First, we need to prove that the country does not have an incentive to
employ all resources in reserves (i.e. R￿￿
N 6= ~ ￿ND). To see that this is the case, we compute
the value of HN(R) as R approaches ~ ￿ND:
lim
R!~ ￿ND






￿ z(~ ￿N;R)jR!~ ￿ND
zdF(z) =
= 1 + (￿1)(+1) = ￿1:







0(~ ￿N;R)jR!~ ￿ND ! ￿1:
Moreover,
Z 1
￿ z(~ ￿N;R)jR!~ ￿ND
zdF(z) =
E(zjz ￿ ￿ z(~ ￿N;R))












= 1 ) lim
R!~ ￿ND




1 ￿ F(￿ z(~ ￿N;R)) = 0:
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Clearly, investing all resources into liquidity is not an optimum for the sovereign.
Now, we need to check that the country does not want to invest the entire allowance in
public expenditure (i.e. R￿￿












So, if HN(R)jR=0 > 0 there exists a solution to the problem under consideration. For
HN(R)jR=0 to be positive it must be that, when all resources are invested in productive
inputs, the production function is close to exhausting its returns to scale and its derivative
with respect to R is small enough to bring the second term of HN(R)jR=0 to a value smaller
than 1 (recall that @Y (:;:)=@R = ￿Y 0(:;:) < 0 and @2Y=@R2 = Y 00 < 0).24
Finally, the uniqueness of the solution to the problem in (B.16) is granted if the maxi-
mand is concave. More speci￿cally, the derivative of HN(R) must be negative.
dHN(R)
dR




















































24For example, take the production function Y (~ ￿D￿R) = (￿D￿R)￿, with ￿ < 1; its ￿rst order derivative














For given ￿ 2 (0;1) and g, such expression goes to zero if ￿ is small enough.
25Notice that, for ease of exposition, in the following we are dropping functional forms.
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() j￿￿ z;Rj < j￿Y 0;Rj: (B.23)
Which is equivalent to (A1).
To close the proof, the value of R￿￿
N that solves (B.17) needs to be plugged into ~ ￿N to
compute the optimal discount factor set by creditors under plan N. ￿
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Also in this case, the problem solved by the lender under plan F and the one we solved
in Lemma 3.3.1 are isomorphic, so we follow the steps of the proof in Appendix A with the
use of the Envelope Theorem to pin down the reaction function ~ ￿F = ￿F(R) that solves the
lender￿ s participation constraint.
Under plan F, the sovereign faces the following maximization problem:
max
R
E(UF(~ ￿F;R)) = R +
Z 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;R)
[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿￿: (C.24)
Under the resource and the no-default constraints:
Z 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;R)
[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿;
R ￿ ￿:
We solve the problem by maximizing the following expression, where we denote the
Lagrange multipliers by ￿ and ￿:26
L(R;￿;￿) = R +
Z 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;R)
[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿
nZ 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;R)
[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿
o
￿ ￿(R ￿ ￿):
26Note that, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.3.4, the maximand is concave under (A1).
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The relevant constraints are given below:
@L(R;￿;￿)
@R












[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) ￿ ￿ = 0 (C.26)
@L(R;￿;￿)
@￿












￿ ￿ 0;￿ ￿ 0 (C.30)
There are four cases to be discussed.
Case I: ￿ = ￿ = 0.
In this case, the two constraints are both slack. Then, the optimal level of reserves is







dF(z) = 0: (C.31)
We know from Lemma 3.3.4 that the left-hand-side of the equality above tends to (￿1)
as R tends to ~ ￿FD. Thus, one has that if the following holds,
lim
R!￿







zdF(z) > 0; (C.32)
the solution to the problem is given by R￿￿
F 2 (￿;~ ￿FD).
Case II: ￿ > 0, ￿ = 0.
In this case, the no-default constraint is binding, while the resource constraint is slack
(meaning that R > ￿ at this candidate equilibrium). The optimal level of reserves and the
Lagrange multiplier ￿ are determined by the following conditions:
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[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) = ￿:
Therefore, the optimal value of reserves R￿￿
F is computed by solving the no-default con-


















Note that for ￿
￿￿ to be strictly positive it has to be that at R￿￿














This condition holds if the value of R that solves the no-default condition in this sub-case
is lower than the one given in case II, because there the no-default constraint is slack at the
equilibrium and the same no-default constraint is decreasing in R.27 Therefore, for R￿￿
F > ￿
to be an equilibrium in this case two conditions must hold; namely, (C.31) and (C.33).
Case III: ￿ = 0, ￿ > 0.
In this case, the no-default constraint is slack. Instead, the resource constraint is binding.















F > 0 (C.34)
at any ￿nite value of R in (￿;~ ￿FD).
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More speci￿cally, R￿￿
F = ￿ is an equilibrium if
lim
R!￿









which is equivalent to condition (C.32) above and implies that ￿￿￿ > 0.
Case IV : ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0.
In this case, both the no-default constraint and the resource constraint are binding. The
equilibrium would be determined by:
















[zY (~ ￿F;R) ￿ D]dF(z) > ￿ 8￿ 2 [0;~ ￿FD):
Indeed, if ￿ = 0, then, by construction,
R 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;￿)[zY (~ ￿F;￿) ￿ D]dF(z) > 0. Moreover,
given that @Y (:;:)=@R < 0, if ￿ increases to ~ ￿FD then
R 1
￿ z(~ ￿F;￿)[zY (~ ￿F;￿) ￿ D]dF(z) goes to
0. However, the country cannot deplete available resources in reserves, because the lender
would reply by setting a nil value of the discount factor. Hence, this case cannot be an
equilibrium of the maximization problem.
Finally, to get the equilibrium value of ￿ one has to use the optimal level of R obtained
in each case above and plug it into ~ ￿F.￿
D. Extension with Distributions with Exponential Density Functions
In this extension, we relax the assumption of uniform distribution to show under which
conditions the results of the paper carry over in a setting with exponential density functions.
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We use the assumption of uniform distribution to derive the ￿xed point that solves the
lender￿ s break-even condition. More speci￿cally, we employ the assumption on the shape of
z to show that condition (iv) and condition (v) hold true in the proof of Lemma 3.3.1.













In the case of uniform distributions (D.35) is satis￿ed, because f(￿ z(:)) is constant in ￿
(the second term is negative independently of the type of distribution assumed). In the case
of exponential distributions, a su¢ cient condition for (D.35) to hold is that df(￿ z(￿))=d￿ ￿ 0
















(D.36) is negative if @f(￿ z(￿))=@z ￿ 0 and this is the case if the following assumption
holds:
A2 : i: z s F(z) s.t. argmaxz f(z) = E(z) = 1.
ii: E(z)Y (￿;R) ￿ D = Y (￿;R) ￿ D > 0.
The implications of (A2) are two: the ￿rst is that f(z) reaches its maximum at E(z) = 1
and the second is that the expected value of the production plan is ex-ante pro￿table, so
that ￿ z(￿) < 1. Consequently, f(z) is increasing in z when it is evaluated in ￿ z(￿).










2 = 1: (D.37)
In the proof of Lemma 3.3.1, the result above follows from
Y
0(￿) !￿!0 1
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and from the fact that for a uniform distribution the value of f(￿ z(￿)) is a constant in ￿,
hence
1
(Y (￿))2 !￿!0 1:
When analysing the case of exponential distributions, one needs to show that
f(￿ z(￿))
(Y (￿))2 !￿!0 1:
We can prove it by making use of the following condition:
A3 : lim￿!0 Y 2(￿) < lim￿!0 f(￿ z(￿)).
The inequality above uses a speci￿c in￿nitesimal order that is satis￿ed by a production
function that meets Inada Conditions and exponential density functions. An example may
provide a better understanding of why this is the case. Assume z s N(0;1) and de￿ne
(1=Y (￿)) = x￿, then




t f(x) !￿!0 e
x:
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t=1 - Liquidity shock Nature
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{R + zY ￿ D ￿ ￿g {R ￿ ￿g
Figure 3.2: Game-tree with the country￿ s payo⁄s
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Figure 3.3: Liquidity shock case, plan F and plan N
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium discount factors
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Figure 3.5: Numerical Example - Liquidity Shock Likelihood (￿)
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Figure 3.6: Numerical Example - Productivity Shock Variance (c2=3)
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Figure 3.7: Numerical Example - Liquidity Injection (")
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Figure 3.8: Risk-averse country
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Figure 3.9: Comparison, risk-neutral v. risk-averse country
Corneli, Flavia (2011), Global Imbalances: Saving and Investment Imbalances 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/25636E.. FIGURES 129
Figure 3.10: IMF intervention
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